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Comptroller of the Currency

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As of March 2025, the OCC no longer examines for reputation risk. This publication has been updated.



# DIRECTOR'S BOOK

Role of Directors for National Banks  
and Federal Savings Associations

**As of March 2025, references to reputation risk have been removed from this publication. Refer to OCC Bulletin 2025-4. Pages in this book where reputation risk references were removed are indicated by text in the top margin.**



# **DIRECTOR'S BOOK**

Role of Directors for National Banks  
and Federal Savings Associations



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# Preface

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks and federal savings associations<sup>1</sup> (collectively, banks). The OCC's mission is to ensure that banks operate in a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial services, treat customers fairly, and comply with applicable laws and regulations.

The OCC has the authority to

- examine banks and their affiliates.<sup>2</sup>
- approve or deny applications for new charters, branches, capital, or other corporate transactions.<sup>3</sup>
- take actions against banks that do not comply with laws and regulations or that otherwise engage in unsafe or unsound practices.
- take actions on current or former institution-affiliated parties (IAP) (e.g., remove officers and directors, approve officers and directors, negotiate agreements to change banking practices, issue cease-and-desist (C&D) orders, and assess civil money penalties (CMP)).
- issue guidance, rules and regulations, legal interpretations, and corporate decisions governing investments, lending, and other activities.

Because boards of directors play critical roles in the successful operation of banks, the OCC developed the *Director's Book: Role of Directors for National Banks and Federal Savings Associations* to provide practical information for directors in fulfilling their responsibilities in a prudent manner. This book provides an overview of the OCC, outlines directors' and management's roles and responsibilities, explains basic concepts and standards for safe and sound operation of banks, and delineates many laws

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<sup>1</sup> Effective July 1, 2019, federal savings associations (FSA) that meet eligibility criteria may elect to operate as covered savings associations (CSA). Refer to OCC Bulletin 2019-25, "Covered Savings Associations: Final Rule," and OCC Bulletin 2019-31, "Covered Savings Associations Implementation: Covered Savings Associations." Covered savings associations are generally subject to provisions of law applicable to national banks, except for provisions related to governance and as otherwise provided in 12 CFR 101.4. Refer also to the OCC's *Key Differences Among National Bank, Federal Savings Association, and Covered Savings Association Requirements*.

<sup>2</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1820(d), "Annual On-Site Examination of All Insured Depository Institutions Required" (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-insured banks), 12 USC 481, "Appointment of Examiners; Examination of Member Banks, State Banks, and Trust Companies; Reports" (national banks), 12 USC 1463, "Supervision of Savings Associations" (FSAs), and 12 USC 1464, "Federal Savings Associations" (FSAs). For more information regarding the OCC's authority to examine affiliates, refer to the "Bank Supervision Process" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*, appendix A, "Functional Regulation."

<sup>3</sup> For more information, refer to the *Comptroller's Licensing Manual*.

## Preface

and regulations that apply to banks.<sup>4</sup> When it is necessary to distinguish between national banks and federal savings associations (FSA), they are referred to separately in this book.

This book does not create rights or legal protections for banks or directors, nor does it create obligations for the OCC. Directors should continually review their responsibilities, assess their conduct, and seek advice from legal counsel when necessary.

For purposes of this book, the term “board” refers to the board of directors or a designated committee thereof unless otherwise stated. The term “senior management” refers to bank employees designated by the board as executives responsible for making key decisions. Senior management may include, but is not limited to, the president, chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer, chief risk executive (CRE),<sup>5</sup> chief information officer, chief compliance officer, chief credit officer, chief auditor, and chief bank counsel. Titles and positions vary depending on the bank’s structure, size, and complexity. Unless otherwise noted, the book uses the terms “CEO” and “president” to refer to the individual appointed by the board to oversee the bank’s day-to-day activities. The term “management” refers to bank managers responsible for carrying out the bank’s day-to-day activities, including goals established by senior management.

For more information about a particular bank activity and its associated risks, directors can refer to the *Comptroller’s Handbook*, including the “Corporate and Risk Governance” booklet.

### Heightened Standards

Specific criteria for covered banks, subject to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, are noted in text boxes like this one throughout this booklet. 12 CFR 30, appendix D.I.E.5, “Covered Bank,” describes banks subject to “OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches” (heightened standards).

<sup>4</sup> The corporate governance provisions discussed in the *Director’s Book: Role of Directors for National Banks and Federal Savings Associations* are not intended to, nor do they exceed, applicable state law requirements.

<sup>5</sup> A CRE is also commonly known as a chief risk officer.

# OCC's Bank Supervision Organizational Structure

For supervisory purposes, the OCC designates banks as community, midsize, or large. These designations are based on a bank's asset size<sup>6</sup> and factors that affect its risk profile and complexity, such as

- whether the bank and its affiliates are part of a much larger banking organization (e.g., under a bank holding company or savings and loan holding company).
- whether supervision requires extensive coordination with other regulators.
- whether the bank or company
  - is a dominant player within its market.
  - performs significant international activities.
  - owns unique subsidiaries.
  - offers high-risk, specialized, or complex products or services.
  - conducts sophisticated capital market activities.
  - has large asset management operations.

The OCC's organizational structure is designed for effective supervision of different types of banks, with oversight by the OCC's Chief Operating Officer for coordination and integration of the OCC's bank supervision activities.

## Midsize and Community Banks

Midsize and community banks are supervised under the Senior Deputy Comptroller for Midsize and Community Bank Supervision, who is supported by several deputy comptrollers. Each of the deputy comptrollers in Midsize and Community Bank Supervision oversees the supervision of a portfolio of banks by his or her assistant deputy comptrollers.

Assistant deputy comptrollers in local field offices supervise portfolios of community banks and staffs of local examiners. Each community bank is assigned a portfolio manager who serves as the OCC's primary contact for bank management and the board on an ongoing basis. In their dialogues with bank management, portfolio managers develop a high level of understanding of banks' activities that guides the OCC's supervisory strategy for each bank. Portfolio managers understand the local economy.

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<sup>6</sup> Generally, community banks have up to \$10 billion in total assets, midsize banks have up to \$50 billion in total assets, and large banks have over \$50 billion in total assets.

## OCC's Bank Supervision Organizational Structure

They also understand the operating conditions and risks in banks' markets and can discuss recently implemented or proposed regulations, trends in current examination findings, and other current topics. OCC specialists provide assistance to portfolio managers as necessary.

Assistant deputy comptrollers in Washington, D.C., supervise portfolios of midsize banks. Unlike community banks, midsize banks are not assigned portfolio managers. Rather, an examiner-in-charge is assigned full time to each midsize bank to provide day-to-day supervision with the help of teams of examiners. Some of the largest midsize banks have resident staff assigned, similar to large banks. Examiners-in-charge for midsize banks report to assistant deputy comptrollers.

## Large Banks

Large banks and federal branches and agencies are supervised under the Senior Deputy Comptroller for Large Bank Supervision. Large bank deputy comptrollers are responsible for overseeing the supervision of a portfolio of banks. An examiner-in-charge is assigned full time to each large bank to provide day-to-day supervision. Because of the vast operating scope of large banks, the OCC assigns examination teams to work full time at the largest and most complex banks. Large bank examiners-in-charge report to deputy comptrollers.

## Trust Banks

Trust banks limit their operations to those of a fiduciary, meaning that the bank acts as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, or in other fiduciary capacities and related activities. Trust banks are supervised under the Senior Deputy Comptroller for Midsize and Community Bank Supervision, the Senior Deputy Comptroller for Large Bank Supervision, or the Deputy Comptroller for Systemic Risk Identification Support and Specialty Supervision. Based on their size, complexity, and ownership structure, certain trust banks and the asset management activities of certain banks are supervised under the National Trust Bank Program, under the Deputy Comptroller for Systemic Risk Identification Support and Specialty Supervision. Each trust bank under the National Trust Bank Program is assigned a portfolio manager with extensive asset management expertise who serves as the OCC's primary contact for bank management and the board on an ongoing basis.

# Full-Scope, On-Site Examination Requirement and Supervisory Activities

Banks must receive a full-scope, on-site examination every 12 or 18 months.<sup>7</sup> The required full-scope, on-site examination frequency is known as the supervisory cycle. The statutory and regulatory requirements set the maximum supervisory cycle length and do not limit the OCC's authority to examine a bank as frequently as the OCC deems appropriate.<sup>8</sup>

The full-scope, on-site examination requirement may be fulfilled by conducting one examination, which is sufficient in scope to assign the bank's CAMELS<sup>9</sup> rating (most common in community banks) or by aggregating several supervisory activities<sup>10</sup> (most common in midsize and large banks). Even when a bank receives one full-scope examination during its supervisory cycle, examiners conduct ongoing supervision to assess risks on an ongoing basis throughout the bank's supervisory cycle. The OCC also conducts target examinations in some banks. Target examinations may focus on one particular product (e.g., credit cards), function (e.g., audit), or risk (e.g., operational risk) or may cover specialty areas (e.g., municipal securities dealers). A target examination alone does not fulfill the requirements of the statutory full-scope, on-site examination but may fulfill a portion of the requirements. The OCC maintains a written supervisory strategy for each bank, which details the supervisory activities that will be conducted during the bank's supervisory cycle.

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<sup>7</sup> 12 USC 1820(d) requires the OCC to conduct a full-scope, on-site examination of each insured depository institution every 12 or 18 months. The OCC applies this statutory examination requirement to all types of banks (federal branches and agencies excepted), regardless of FDIC-insured status, in 12 CFR 4.6, "Frequency of Examination of National Banks and Federal Savings Associations."

<sup>8</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 4.6(c), "Authority to Conduct More Frequent Examinations."

<sup>9</sup> A bank's composite rating under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, or CAMELS, integrates ratings from six component areas: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. Evaluations of the component areas take into consideration the bank's size and sophistication, the nature and complexity of its activities, and its risk profile.

<sup>10</sup> Supervisory activities include examinations and other activities, such as ongoing supervision.

## Full-Scope, On-Site Examination Requirement and Supervisory Activities

The OCC's supervisory authority is not limited to the bank itself. As the primary regulator of national banks and FSAs, the OCC also has authority over bank subsidiaries, including the authority to examine, require reports from, and take other actions against these subsidiaries.<sup>11</sup> Further, the OCC has the authority to examine affiliates<sup>12</sup> and functions or operations performed on behalf of a bank by a third party.<sup>13</sup> Certain service providers are examined on a 24-, 36-, or 48-month cycle based on the Examination Priority Ranking Program described in the "Supervision of Technology Service Providers" booklet of the *Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Information Technology Examination Handbook*. Additionally, at least one interim review is required between regularly scheduled examinations.

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<sup>11</sup> For more information on the OCC's authority over such entities, refer to the "Functional Regulation" section of the "Bank Supervision Process" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

<sup>12</sup> For more information on national banks, refer to 12 USC 481. For FSAs, refer to 12 USC 1464(d)(1) (B), "Ancillary Provisions."

<sup>13</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1867(c), "Services Performed by Contract or Otherwise" (national banks and FSAs) and 12 USC 1464(d)(7), "Regulation and Examination of Savings Association Service Companies, Subsidiaries, and Service Providers" (FSAs).

# OCC's Risk-Based Supervision Approach

In carrying out its mission, the OCC employs an ongoing risk-based supervision approach focused on evaluating risk, identifying material and emerging concerns, and requiring banks to take timely corrective action before deficiencies compromise their safety and soundness. Risk-based supervision places the responsibility for controlling risks with the board and management.

Under the OCC's risk-based supervision approach, OCC examiners assess how well a bank manages its risks over time, rather than assessing the bank's condition at a single point in time. Examiners determine how existing or emerging issues for a bank, its affiliates, or the banking industry as a whole affect the nature and extent of risks in that bank. Examiners evaluate risk using the OCC's risk assessment system and tailor supervisory activities to the risks identified. The risk-based supervision approach concentrates on systemic risks and banks that pose the greatest risk to the federal banking system. Under this approach, the OCC allocates greater resources to areas of higher risk by

- identifying risk using common definitions.
- measuring risk using common methods of evaluation. Risk cannot always be quantified in dollars. For example, numerous or significant internal control deficiencies may indicate excessive operational risk.
- evaluating risk management to determine whether the bank's risk management practices adequately identify, measure, monitor, and control risk.
- determining the aggregate level and direction of each risk and the bank's overall risk profile.
- performing examinations based on the core assessment, expanded procedures, or verification procedures, reaching conclusions on the bank's risk profile and condition, and following up on areas of concern.

For more information about the categories of risk and the OCC's risk-based supervision approach, refer to the "Bank Supervision Process" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

## Regulatory Ratings

The OCC and other federal bank regulatory agencies use the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, or CAMELS, to assign composite and component ratings to banks.

The OCC uses other rating systems to assign ratings to specific aspects of a bank's activities. These include the

- Uniform Rating System for Information Technology
- Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System
- Uniform Interagency Consumer Compliance Rating System

The composite and component ratings disclosed in writing to the bank are subject to the confidentiality rules imposed by 12 CFR 4.<sup>14</sup>

Separately, the OCC assigns a rating for the bank's record of performance under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and compliance with regulations implementing the CRA. CRA ratings are published publicly in a bank's performance evaluation.

Refer to the "Bank Supervision Process booklet" of the *Comptroller's Handbook* for more information about rating systems.

## Communication

The OCC promotes open communication between examiners and bank directors. Establishing and maintaining open and regular communications with the OCC helps the board and management understand expectations for risk management and governance and apply them to normal duties and responsibilities. OCC staff has experience with a broad range of banking activities and can provide independent, objective advice on safe and sound banking practices, including compliance with laws and regulations.<sup>15</sup>

Examiners meet with management throughout the supervisory cycle and typically before, during, and after supervisory activities. When a bank's supervisory cycle is complete, examiners also meet with the board to discuss the OCC's supervision of the bank, results of the examination(s), and other topics. For smaller affiliates of larger banks, the OCC may instead meet with the lead bank's board. Independent directors are encouraged to meet with OCC examiners without management's presence.

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<sup>14</sup> Refer to OCC Bulletin 2019-15, "Supervisory Ratings and Other Nonpublic OCC Information: Statement on Confidentiality."

<sup>15</sup> The OCC does not provide legal advice to banks or directors. Banks and directors should consult their own legal counsel for legal advice.

## OCC's Risk-Based Supervision Approach

The OCC provides written communication through supervisory letters and reports of examination. Supervisory letters and reports of examination communicate the bank's ratings, significant risks, matters requiring attention (MRA), violations of laws and regulations,<sup>16</sup> and the status of outstanding enforcement actions, as applicable.

MRAs communicate the OCC's concern with deficient practices, which are practices that

- deviate from sound governance, internal control, and risk management principles, and have the potential to adversely affect the bank's condition, including its financial performance or risk profile, if not addressed; or
- result in noncompliance with laws and regulations, enforcement actions, or conditions imposed in writing in connection with the approval of any application or other request by the bank.

An MRA includes management's commitment to corrective action, time frames, and persons responsible for corrective action. The OCC expects management, and in some cases the board, to take timely and effective action to correct deficient practices and violations of laws and regulations. The board should oversee management's corrective actions. The failure to properly address deficient practices and violations can cause deterioration in a bank's condition, an increased risk profile, and could serve as the basis for an enforcement action.

Directors should carefully review written communications from the OCC. They should ask questions and raise issues of concern. Directors should assess whether management has effective relations with the OCC, treats compliance issues and supervisory findings seriously, and completes corrective actions on a timely basis. A director who needs help understanding the content of a supervisory letter or report of examination should contact the bank's examiner-in-charge, portfolio manager, or assistant deputy comptroller. Directors should understand all identified deficient practices and violations of laws and regulations and confirm that management completes corrective actions within specified time frames. The OCC may hold individual directors accountable for lack of corrective action for supervisory concerns contained in MRAs, violations of laws and regulations, or enforcement action articles.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> A violation of law or regulation is an act (or failure to act) that deviates from, or fails to comply with, a statutory or regulatory requirement. Violations are often the result of deficient practices. Frequently, correcting violations alone does not address the deficient practices that may have led to the violations. Examiners may communicate concerns in MRAs if bank management has not corrected deficient practices that caused or contributed to violations.

<sup>17</sup> For more information, refer to the "Actions Against Individuals" section of this book.

## OCC's Risk-Based Supervision Approach

The OCC's supervisory activities in no way diminish the board's responsibilities to oversee the management and operation of the bank. Directors are responsible for knowing the bank's condition and should not rely on the OCC as their sole source for identifying or correcting problems. Instead, the board should look to senior management, auditors, and other independent experts to identify and correct problems.

In summary, the OCC expects the board to

- hold management accountable for deficient practices and violations.
- direct management to develop and implement corrective actions.
- approve the necessary development or changes to the bank's policies, processes, and controls.
- establish processes to monitor progress and confirm management completes corrective actions.

For more information on MRAs and violations of laws and regulations, refer to the "Bank Supervision Process" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

## Appeals Process

The OCC strives for consistent and equitable supervision and seeks to resolve disputes that arise during the supervisory process fairly and expeditiously in an informal, amicable manner. Banks are encouraged to contact the OCC ombudsman to discuss any agency policy, decision, or action that might develop into an appealable matter. The ombudsman's objective in these cases is to seek a resolution to the dispute before it develops into an appeal. If banks cannot resolve disagreements through this discussion, they are encouraged to file an appeal with the applicable supervisory office or the ombudsman to seek a further review of the decisions or actions in dispute.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> For more information on the appeals process, refer to the "Bank Appeals" page on the OCC's website.

## OCC's Risk-Based Supervision Approach

Functioning as an independent advisor and decision maker, the ombudsman can accept, for example, appeals related to

- examination ratings.
- the adequacy of the allowance for loan and lease loss methodology.
- individual loan ratings.
- Shared National Credit decisions.
- fair lending-related decisions.
- licensing decisions.
- material supervisory determinations such as MRAs, compliance with enforcement actions, or other conclusions in the report of examination.

The ombudsman may not accept, for example, appeals related to

- the appointment of receivers and conservators.
- preliminary examination conclusions communicated to a bank before a final report of examination is issued.
- enforcement-related actions or decisions.
- formal and informal rulemakings pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
- requests for information filed under the Freedom of Information Act.

With the prior consent of the Comptroller of the Currency, the ombudsman may stay an appealable agency decision or action during the resolution of an appealable matter.

# Resources

## OCC Resources

The OCC provides information and tools that can help bank management and directors identify and respond to emerging risks and keep track and informed of new or changing regulatory requirements.

A useful website for directors and management is BankNet, which facilitates information exchange between the OCC and OCC-supervised banks. BankNet is a secure site available only to OCC-supervised banks and delivers accurate, timely, and confidential data. To assist directors and management in meeting their responsibilities, the site provides tools, applications, services, and information, some of which is not obtainable elsewhere.

The OCC provides other resources on the OCC's website at [www.occ.gov](http://www.occ.gov) such as the OCC's *Semiannual Risk Perspective* report, which offers an in-depth assessment of risks in the federal banking system. Bankers and directors can subscribe to OCC news email listservs and RSS feeds to receive OCC alerts, bulletins, news releases, and public service podcasts. The OCC engages in substantial outreach to bankers and directors, including director workshops held throughout the year that focus on the fundamentals of being a director as well as hot topics and critical updates. In addition, directors have access to highly trained OCC staff, including lead experts and policy analysts, as well as the OCC's legal and licensing staffs.

## Other Resources

The board may need to contact federal bank regulatory agencies other than the OCC, namely, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Table 1 summarizes, as applicable to national banks and FSAs, the primary and secondary supervisory responsibilities of the three prudential bank regulatory agencies—the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC.

**Table 1:** Prudential Supervisory Responsibilities for National Banks and FSAs

Federal banking agency	Prudential supervisory responsibilities	
	Primary	Secondary
OCC	National banks and FSAs	
Federal Reserve	Bank and savings and loan holding companies	National bank members of the Federal Reserve System
FDIC		FDIC-insured national banks and FSAs

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau examines for and enforces certain consumer protection-related laws and regulations with respect to insured depository institutions with total assets of more than \$10 billion and their holding companies and affiliates.<sup>19</sup> For banks with total assets of \$10 billion or less, the OCC is responsible for examining compliance with all applicable consumer protection-related laws and regulations. The OCC evaluates the quantity of risk and the quality of compliance risk management and assigns consumer compliance ratings for all banks.

Directors should be aware that certain activities may be subject to regulation by other federal and state agencies. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and state insurance commissioners are the primary regulators of bank subsidiaries engaged in securities, commodities, and insurance activities, respectively.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Section 1025 of the Dodd–Frank Act (12 USC 5515) granted the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau exclusive authority to examine insured depository institutions with more than \$10 billion in total assets and their affiliates for compliance with enumerated federal consumer financial laws. Refer to 12 USC 5481 for the definition of enumerated federal consumer financial laws.

<sup>20</sup> Banks may have to register as swap dealers or security-based swap dealers with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, respectively. The OCC may examine any part of the bank, require reports related to any of its activities, and take other actions related to any of its activities—even those regulated by other agencies. For more information on the OCC’s authority over such entities, refer to the “Functional Regulation” section of the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet of the *Comptroller’s Handbook*.

# Corporate Governance

The board and management should be transparent about their corporate and risk governance structure and practices, with particular emphasis on board composition, the director nominating process, management succession plans, compensation, and other issues important to shareholders. The board and senior management should also play an active role in communicating with shareholders and adhering to disclosure practices. Serious errors or omissions in the bank's disclosure requirements may result in violations of laws or regulations, which in turn could lead to significant regulatory penalties. The board and management should view enhanced transparency and communication as a means of building trust and public confidence that enhance the bank's value and potentially provide access to capital and funding markets.

## Board's Role in Corporate Governance

The board plays a pivotal role in the effective governance of its bank. The board is accountable to shareholders, regulators, and other stakeholders. The board is responsible for overseeing management, providing organizational leadership, and establishing core corporate values. The board should create a corporate and risk governance framework to facilitate oversight and help set the bank's strategic direction, risk culture, and risk appetite. The board also oversees the talent management processes for senior management, which include development, recruiting, succession planning, and compensation.

The board should have a clear understanding of its roles and responsibilities. It should collectively have the skills and qualifications, committee structure, communication and reporting systems, and processes necessary to provide effective oversight. The board should be willing and able to act independently and provide a credible challenge to management.

The corporate and risk governance framework should provide for independent assessments of the quality, accuracy, and effectiveness of the bank's risk management functions, financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. Most often performed by the bank's audit function, independent assurances are essential to the board's effective oversight of management.

The board's role in the governance of the bank is clearly distinct from management's role. The board is responsible for the overall direction and oversight of the bank—but is not responsible for managing the bank day-

to-day. The board should oversee and hold management accountable for meeting strategic objectives within the bank's risk appetite. Both the board and management should ensure the bank is operating in a safe and sound manner and complying with laws and regulations.

## Board Composition, Qualifications, and Selection

Board composition should facilitate effective oversight. The ideal board is well diversified and composed of individuals with a mix of knowledge and expertise in line with the bank's size, strategy, risk profile, and complexity. Although the qualifications of individual directors will vary, the directors should provide the collective expertise, experience, and perspectives necessary for effectively overseeing the bank. Boards of larger, more complex banks should include directors who have the ability to understand the organizational complexities and the risks inherent in the bank's businesses. Individual directors also should lend expertise to the board's risk oversight and compliance responsibilities. In addition, the board and its directors must meet the statutory and regulatory requirements governing size, composition, and other aspects. Refer to appendix A of this booklet for a list of these requirements.

The board should be willing and able to exercise independent judgment and provide credible challenge to management's decisions and recommendations. The board also should have an appropriate level of commitment and engagement to carry out its duties and responsibilities.

To promote director independence, the board should ensure an appropriate mix of "inside" and "outside" directors. Inside directors are bank officers or other bank employees. Outside directors are not bank employees. Directors are viewed as independent if they are free of any family relationships or any material business or professional relationships (other than stock ownership and directorship itself) with the bank or its management. Independent directors bring experiences from their fields of expertise. These experiences provide perspective and objectivity because independent directors oversee bank operations and evaluate management recommendations. This mix of inside and outside directors promotes arms-length oversight. A board that is subject to excessive management influence may not be able to effectively fulfill its fiduciary and oversight responsibilities.

Generally, a director should

- be willing and able to exercise independent judgment and provide credible challenge to management's decisions and recommendations.
- have basic knowledge of the banking industry, financial regulatory system, and laws and regulations that govern the bank's operation.

- have background, knowledge, and experience in business or another discipline to facilitate bank oversight.
- accept fiduciary duties and obligations, including a firm commitment to put the bank's interests ahead of personal interests and to avoid conflicts of interest.
- have firm commitment to regularly attend and be prepared for board and committee meetings.
- have knowledge of the communities that the bank serves.

### Heightened Standards

To promote effective, independent oversight of a covered bank's management, at least two members of the board

- should not be an officer or employee of the parent company or covered bank and should not have been an officer or employee of the parent company or covered bank during the previous three years.
- should not be a member of the immediate family<sup>21</sup> of a person who is, or has been within the last three years, an executive officer of the parent company or covered bank.<sup>22</sup>
- should qualify as an independent director under the listing standards of a national securities exchange, as demonstrated to the OCC's satisfaction.<sup>23</sup>

To fill board vacancies, the board should establish a process to identify, assess, and select director candidates. The bank's size and complexity may warrant the process to be written. Some boards use a nominating committee. The board or nominating committee should consider whether the director candidate has the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience in light of the bank's business and the risks presented by that business as well as sufficient time to effectively carry out his or her responsibilities. Criteria for desired knowledge, skills, and experience may change over time if, for example, the bank plans to offer new, modified, or expanded products and services. Some boards establish additional criteria depending on certain needs. The director candidate should be willing and able to actively oversee senior management and challenge and require changes in senior management, if necessary. Additionally, inside directors should not use undue influence in selecting board members.

The board candidate should have a record of integrity in his or her personal and professional dealings and a willingness to place the interests of the bank above any conflicting self-interest. The board candidate should

<sup>21</sup> This is defined in 12 CFR 225.41(b)(3), "Immediate Family," of Regulation Y.

<sup>22</sup> This is defined in 12 CFR 215.2(e)(1), "Executive Officer," of Regulation O.

<sup>23</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, III.D, "Include Independent Directors."

disclose any relationships or potential conflicts of interest that the candidate or any of his or her related interests has with the bank or its affiliates. The board should consider whether a potential candidate with significant conflicts of interest that would require him or her to abstain from consideration of issues or transactions is an appropriate candidate. The bank should conduct background checks on potential board members and periodic checks of existing directors.

Diversity among directors is another important aspect of an effective board. The board should actively seek a diverse pool of candidates, including women and minorities, as well as candidates with diverse knowledge of risk management and internal controls.<sup>24</sup>

In most cases, nominees should be able to serve as directors immediately after they are elected in accordance with the bank's bylaws. The bank must file a prior notice with the OCC when any of the following circumstances exist:<sup>25</sup>

- The bank is in troubled condition, as defined by 12 CFR 5.51.
- The bank is not in compliance with minimum capital requirements as prescribed in 12 CFR 3, "Capital Adequacy Standards."
- The OCC determines, in writing, in connection with the OCC's review of a capital restoration plan under 12 USC 1831o, "Prompt Corrective Action," or otherwise, that such prior notice is appropriate.

The OCC also generally requires prior notice for new directors under additional circumstances, such as de novo banks, change in bank control, or conversions to a federal charter.<sup>26</sup>

Directors should adhere to the attendance policy for regular and special board meetings. A director of a national bank may not participate or vote by proxy.<sup>27</sup> Excessive absences may be grounds for director dismissal. For more information, refer to the "Attend and Participate in Board and Committee Meetings" section of this booklet.

<sup>24</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2015-30, "Standards for Assessing the Diversity Policies and Practices of Regulated Entities: Final Interagency Policy Statement."

<sup>25</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 1831i, "Agency Disapproval of Directors and Senior Executive Officers of Insured Depository Institutions or Depository Institution Holding Companies," and 12 CFR 5.51, "Changes in Directors and Senior Executive Officers of a National Bank or Federal Savings Association." Also, refer to the "Changes in Directors and Senior Executive Officers" and "Background Investigations" booklets of the *Comptroller's Licensing Manual*.

<sup>26</sup> Refer to the "Charters," "Change in Bank Control," and "Conversions to Federal Charter" booklets of the *Comptroller's Licensing Manual* for more information.

<sup>27</sup> For national banks, refer to 12 CFR 7.2009, "Quorum of the Board of Directors; Proxies Not Permissible."

## Leadership Structure of the Board

The board should determine the appropriate leadership structure. The individual selected as board chair plays a crucial leadership role in the board's proper functioning. The board chair should promote candid dialogue, encourage critical discussion, and support directors to express any dissenting views. The chair should strive to promote a well-functioning, informed, independent, and deliberative decision-making process. The chair should also have the requisite qualities, including being a respected and trusted board member, and have appropriate leadership and communication skills.

These are the two most common structures for board leadership:

- The chair is independent of the CEO.
- When the CEO and chair are the same person, the board appoints a lead director who is independent of management.

Both structures can be equally effective. When the board chair and the CEO are different individuals, however, having the separate roles may promote a more appropriate balance of power between the board and senior management.

When the board appoints a lead director in addition to a chair who also is the CEO, the board should clearly define the lead director's role. For example, a lead director typically maintains ongoing communication with the CEO, leads executive sessions of the board, works with the CEO and the board to set the board agenda, and facilitates communication between the directors and the CEO.

## Outside Advisors and Advisory Directors

From time to time, the board and board committees may need to seek advice from outside advisors, who are independent of management. For example, there may be technical aspects of the bank's business—such as risk assessments, accounting matters, strategic planning, or compensation—where additional expert advice would be useful. The board should have the necessary financial resources to hire external experts to help the board fulfill its fiduciary responsibilities. Audit committees of certain banks must have members with banking or related financial management expertise, have access to their own outside counsel, and not include any large customers of the bank.<sup>28</sup> These committees may also have their own advisors.

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<sup>28</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 363.5(b), "Committees of Large Institutions." This pertains to audit committees of any bank with more than \$3 billion in total assets as of the beginning of the fiscal year. Refer to the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook* for more information on other audit committee independence considerations.

Although qualified consultants can provide needed expertise and counsel, the board should ensure that no improper conflicts of interest exist between the bank and the consultant so that the board receives only objective and independent advice.

To leverage outside expertise, the board may consider using advisory directors. These individuals provide information and advice but do not vote as part of the board. The bank may use advisory directors in a number of situations, including

- when the operations of the bank are geographically dispersed and the board wants input from more segments of the communities served by the bank.
- when the board is small and the directors want direct involvement with a broader array of community leaders.
- to assist in business development.
- to gain access to special expertise to help the board with planning and decision making.
- to help identify likely candidates for future board openings.

Because of their limited role, advisory directors generally are not liable for board decisions. The facts and circumstances of a particular situation determine if an advisory director may have liability for individual decisions. Factors affecting potential liability include

- whether advisory directors were elected or appointed.
- how corporate documents identified advisory directors.
- the extent to which the advisory directors participated in board meetings.
- whether advisory directors exercised significant influence on the voting process.
- how the bank compensated advisory directors for attending board meetings.
- whether the advisory director had a previous relationship with the bank.

Additionally, an advisory director who, in fact, functions as a full director may be liable for board decisions in which he or she participated as if that advisory director were a full director. The OCC expects that individuals will not shield their actions from liability simply by having the word “advisory” in their titles.

## Board and Board Committee Meeting Minutes

Minutes of board and board committee meetings are an essential part of the bank’s records capturing the board’s deliberations and actions. Board meeting minutes should be complete and accurate. Minutes should

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document the board's review and discussion of material action items on the agenda, any actions taken, follow-up items to be addressed at subsequent meetings, and any other issues that may arise (including approval of previous meeting minutes and board-approved policies).

Minutes should record the attendance of each director, other attendees, and directors' votes or abstentions. The record of board meetings and activities should include all materials distributed to the board for informational, oversight, or monitoring purposes. Each director should have the opportunity to review and, if appropriate, modify the minutes before the board ratifies them. Board minutes should be timely and presented for approval at the next meeting of the board. In addition, the board should receive regular reports or minutes from the various committee meetings.

The board should address the level of detail required for minutes and records of board meetings. Minutes may be subject to discovery, for example, during stockholder derivative litigation.<sup>29</sup> Board minutes should include sufficient information to reflect that directors were fully informed about the relevant facts, carefully deliberated the issues, provided credible challenge when necessary, and made decisions based on the best interests of the bank and its shareholders.

For stock FSAs, including covered savings association (CSA), a director's presence at a meeting at which actions are taken on behalf of the bank is considered assenting to the action unless his or her abstention or dissent is entered in the meeting minutes. A director may also file a written dissent to the action with the secretary before the meeting is adjourned or send a written dissent by registered mail to the secretary within five days after the meeting minutes are received.<sup>30</sup>

## Access to Senior Management and Staff

Directors should have full access to all employees, if needed, but particularly senior management. Direct interaction with key staff can balance viewpoints and help ensure that information going to the board is not overly filtered. Direct interaction also can help directors deal with succession planning and management development. In addition, direct interaction with employees allows directors to assess how the corporate culture has been implemented throughout the bank. Directors can use these contacts to determine what behaviors senior managers promote.

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<sup>29</sup> In stockholder derivative litigation, a shareholder sues both the corporation and a third party. The third party, often an executive officer or director of the corporation, is the actual defendant. The shareholder seeks recovery for the corporation from the third party.

<sup>30</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 5.22(l)(10), "Presumption of Assent" (stock FSAs, including stock CSAs).

## Director Orientation and Training

The board should conduct orientation programs for new directors. Orientation programs vary according to bank size and complexity. At a minimum, these programs should explain

- the bank's organizational structure, corporate culture, operations, strategic plans, risk appetite, and significant issues.
- the importance of Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)/anti-money laundering (AML) regulatory requirements, the ramifications of noncompliance with the BSA, and the BSA/AML risk posed to the bank.
- the individual and group responsibilities of board members, the roles of the various board committees, and the roles and responsibilities of senior management.

Directors should understand their roles and responsibilities and deepen their knowledge of the bank's business, operations, risks, and management. The board should periodically assess its skills and competencies relative to the bank's size and complexity, identify gaps, and take appropriate actions.

Management can help the board develop an ongoing education and training program to keep directors informed and current on general industry trends and regulatory developments, particularly regarding issues that pertain to their bank.

### Heightened Standards

The board should establish and adhere to a formal, ongoing training program for all directors. This program should consider the directors' knowledge and experience and the covered bank's risk profile. The program should include, as appropriate, training on the following:

- Complex products, services, lines of business, and risks that have a significant impact on the covered bank.
- Laws, regulations, and supervisory requirements applicable to the covered bank.
- Other topics identified by the board.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, "OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches"; appendix D, III; and appendix D, III.E, "Provide Ongoing Training to All Directors."

## Board Compensation

Directors should be compensated fairly and appropriately. Given the demands on a director's time and the responsibilities, director compensation should be competitive and sufficient to attract and retain qualified individuals. The board or a designated committee sets and periodically reevaluates director compensation. Such compensation should be aligned with industry standards and be commensurate with an individual director's responsibilities. The board also should safeguard against payment of compensation, fees, and benefits that are excessive or that could lead to material financial loss to the bank. Excessive compensation is considered an unsafe or unsound practice. Additionally, if the bank falls below required capital minimums, the compensation paid to directors should be reassessed. The reassessment may include reducing or eliminating the fees paid.

## Board Tenure

A director tenure policy, though not a requirement for either public or nonpublic banks, can help the bank maintain skilled, objective, and engaged board members. A tenure policy or bylaws may, for example, establish

- director term limits.
- a mandatory retirement age.

A tenure policy can provide a road map for the board's natural evolution and create a structured process to obtain fresh ideas and promote critical thinking from new directors. A tenure policy protects against the board losing objectivity and effectiveness if long-time directors become less active, less committed, complacent, or too comfortable with the status quo. On the other hand, mandatory retirement may result in the loss of directors whose contributions to the bank continue to be valuable.

## Board's Responsibilities

The board is responsible for

- providing effective oversight.
- exercising independent judgment.
- providing credible challenge to management.
- establishing an appropriate corporate culture and setting the tone at the top.
- understanding the legal and regulatory framework applicable to the bank's activities.

- complying with fiduciary duties and all applicable rules and laws.
- directing and overseeing an effective compliance management system (CMS).
- setting realistic strategic goals and objectives and overseeing management's implementation of those goals and objectives.
- confirming that the bank has a risk management system, including audit, suitable for the bank's size and activities, and understanding the bank's material risks.
- confirming that the bank has an effective system of internal controls.
- holding management accountable for implementing policies and operating within established standards and limits.
- monitoring the bank's operations, overseeing the bank's business performance, and staying informed about the bank's operating and business environment.
- selecting, retaining, and overseeing a competent CEO and senior management team.
- overseeing the compensation and benefits programs.
- setting formal performance standards for senior management, overseeing the talent management process, and approving a management succession policy for the CEO and other key executives.
- establishing and maintaining an appropriate board structure and performing board self-assessments.
- maintaining appropriate affiliate and holding company relationships.
- monitoring and supporting management's efforts to serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which the bank is chartered and its assessment area(s), including the need for credit and deposit services.<sup>32</sup>
- approving the bank's BSA/AML compliance program.<sup>33</sup>
- confirming that management's actions to correct material weaknesses, including those identified by the bank, its auditors, and regulators, are timely and effective.

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<sup>32</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 25, "Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations" (national banks and CSAs) and 12 CFR 195, "Community Reinvestment" (FSAs). Also refer to OCC Bulletin 2018-17, "Community Reinvestment Act: Supervisory Policy and Processes for Community Reinvestment Act Performance Evaluations," for more information regarding CRA, including OCC supervisory policies and procedures regarding how examiners evaluate bank performance under the CRA.

<sup>33</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 21.21, "Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Compliance" and the *FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual*.

### Heightened Standards

Each member of a covered bank's board should oversee the covered bank's compliance with safe and sound banking practices. The board also should require management to establish and implement an effective risk governance framework that meets the minimum standards described in these guidelines. The board or the board's risk committee should approve any significant changes to the risk governance framework and monitor compliance with such framework.<sup>34</sup>

A covered bank's board should actively oversee the covered bank's risk-taking activities and hold management accountable for adhering to the risk governance framework. In providing active oversight, the board may rely on risk assessments and reports prepared by independent risk management (IRM) and internal audit to support the board's ability to question, challenge, and, when necessary, oppose recommendations and decisions made by management that could cause the covered bank's risk profile to exceed its risk appetite or jeopardize the safety and soundness of the bank.<sup>35</sup>

When providing active oversight under paragraph III.B of heightened standards guidelines, each member of the board should exercise sound, independent judgment.<sup>36</sup>

The following pages focus on some of the board's key responsibilities.

#### *Provide Oversight*

The key to effective board oversight is qualified and actively involved directors. Effective board oversight can help the bank withstand economic downturns, problems with ineffective management, and other concerns. During challenging times, the board should evaluate the bank's condition, take appropriate sustainable corrective actions, and, when necessary, keep the bank operating until the board obtains capable management to fully resolve the bank's problems.

Board oversight is critical to maintain the bank's operations in a safe and sound manner, oversee compliance with laws and regulations, supervise major banking activities, and govern senior management. To fulfill its responsibilities, the board relies on senior management to oversee the key decisions and management to carry out the bank's day-to-day activities. The board also relies on management to provide the board with sound advice on organizational strategies, objectives, structure, and significant

<sup>34</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, III, and appendix D, III.A, "Require an Effective Risk Governance Framework."

<sup>35</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, III, and appendix D, III.B, "Provide Active Oversight of Management."

<sup>36</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, III, and appendix D, III.C, "Exercise Independent Judgment."

policies and to provide accurate and timely information about the bank's risks and financial performance. Several *Comptroller's Handbook* booklets include discussions of the board's oversight duties and management's roles and responsibilities.

### *Establish an Appropriate Corporate Culture*

Corporate culture refers to the norms and values that drive behaviors within an organization. An appropriate corporate culture for a bank is one that does not condone or encourage imprudent risk taking, unethical behavior, or the circumvention of laws, regulations, or safe and sound policies and procedures in pursuit of profits or business objectives. An appropriate corporate culture holds employees accountable. This starts with the board, which is responsible for setting the tone at the top and overseeing management's role in fostering and maintaining a sound corporate and risk culture. Shared values, expectations, and objectives established by the board and senior management promote a sound corporate culture.

To promote a sound corporate culture, the board should

- establish the expectations for desired behaviors; practice and promote the expectations that all business should be conducted in a legal and ethical manner; and oversee adherence to such values by senior management and other employees.
- promote risk awareness within a sound risk culture (refer to the "Risk Culture" section for more information).
- confirm that corporate values and the code of conduct are communicated throughout the bank.
- promote clear lines of authority and accountability.
- hold management accountable for transparent and timely information.

To promote a sound corporate culture, management should

- demonstrate commitment to the corporate culture and expect the same from all employees.
- integrate the culture into the bank's strategic planning process and risk management practices.
- include desired behaviors in performance reviews and compensation practices.
- engage in continuous employee communication and training regarding risk management practices and standards of conduct.
- report and escalate material risk issues, suspected fraud, and illegal or unethical activities to the board.

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*Code of Ethics*

The board should adopt a written code of ethics (or code of conduct) to set expected standards of behavior and professional conduct for all employees. The board should oversee management's development and periodic review of the code of ethics and other policies that address board and employee conduct, insider activities, conflicts of interest, and other relevant ethical issues. The code of ethics should encourage the timely and confidential communication of suspected fraud, misconduct, or abuse to a higher level within the bank. Such a code is intended to foster a culture of integrity and accountability.

The bank's code of ethics should address the following:

- **Conflicts of interest:** A conflict of interest occurs when an individual's private interests conflict with the bank's interests.
- **Insider activities:** Directors and executive officers should refrain from financial relationships that are or could be viewed as abusive, imprudent, or preferential. In addition, laws and regulations prohibit certain insider activities.<sup>37</sup>
- **Self-dealing and corporate opportunity:** Employees, officers, and directors are prohibited from using corporate property, information, or their positions for personal gain. Usurpation of a corporate opportunity is a breach of fiduciary duty.
- **Confidentiality:** All bank employees, officers, and directors must maintain the confidentiality of bank, customer, and personnel information, as required by law.
- **Fair dealing:** Employees, officers, and directors should not conceal information, abuse privileged information, misrepresent material facts, or engage in any other unfair dealing practice.
- **Protection and use of bank assets:** Company assets should be used for legitimate business purposes.
- **Compliance:** All bank employees, officers, and directors must comply with applicable laws and regulations.

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<sup>37</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 1828(z), "General Prohibition on Sale of Assets"; 12 CFR 215, "Loans to Executive Officers, Directors, and Principal Shareholders of Member Banks (Regulation O)"; 12 CFR 31, "Extensions of Credit to Insiders and Transactions With Affiliates"; and the "Insider Activities" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

- **Whistle-blower policy:** The bank should have a process for employees to report legitimate concerns about suspected illegal, unethical, or questionable practices with protection from reprisal. This process includes the ability to escalate operational problems, inappropriate conduct, policy violations, or other risks to the bank for investigation.
- **Consequences:** Employees, officers, and directors should have a clear understanding of the consequences of unethical, illegal, or other behaviors that do not align with the bank's code of ethics (or code of conduct).

The bank should have an ethics officer, bank counsel, or some other individual from whom employees can seek advice regarding ethics questions. Ethics policies should include a process for the annual review and discussion of ethics rules at all levels of the bank, including the board. Ethics policies should be reinforced as an important part of each director's, senior manager's, and employee's performance review.

Internal audit plays an important role in monitoring the effectiveness of the bank's ethics program and whistle-blower policy. Internal audit should assess the bank's corporate culture and standards and ethics processes to identify any governance-related weaknesses. Internal audit should assure the board that suspected fraud and misconduct are promptly reported, investigated, and addressed.

### *Comply With Fiduciary Duties and the Law*

Directors' activities are governed by common law fiduciary legal principles, which impose two duties—the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.

The duty of care requires that directors act in good faith, with the level of care that ordinarily prudent persons would exercise in similar circumstances and in a manner that the directors reasonably believe is in the bank's best interests. The duty of care requires directors to acquire sufficient knowledge of the material facts related to proposed activities or transactions, thoroughly examine all information available to them, and actively participate in decision making.

The duty of loyalty requires that directors exercise their powers in the best interests of the bank and its shareholders rather than in the directors' own self-interest or in the interests of any other person. Directors taking action on particular activities or transactions must be objective, meaning the directors must consider the activities or transactions on their merits, free from any extraneous influences. The duty of loyalty primarily relates to

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conflicts of interest, confidentiality, and corporate opportunity. Directors of FSAs, including CSAs, are also subject to specific conflict of interest and corporate opportunity regulations.<sup>38</sup>

Each director should personally ensure that his or her conduct reflects the level of care and loyalty required of a bank director. A bank director—like the director of any corporate entity—may be held personally liable in lawsuits for losses resulting from his or her breach of fiduciary duties. Shareholders or members (either individually or on behalf of the bank), depositors, or creditors who allege injury by a director's failure to fulfill these duties may bring these suits. In addition, the OCC may take enforcement action, including assessment of CMPs, against a director for breach of fiduciary duty.<sup>39</sup> The OCC may assess director liability individually because the nature of any breach of fiduciary duty can vary for each director.

Additionally, a bank director may be criminally liable for his or her actions as a director and may incur criminal liability if the director

- falsifies bank records or causes such records to be falsified.<sup>40</sup>
- misuses or misapplies bank funds or assets.<sup>41</sup>
- requests or accepts fees or gifts to influence, or as a reward for, bank business.<sup>42</sup>
- makes false statements generally.<sup>43</sup>
- commits or attempts to commit fraud.<sup>44</sup>
- willfully violates the BSA or its implementing regulations.<sup>45</sup>

### *Select, Retain, and Oversee Management*

A profitable and sound bank is largely the result of the efforts of talented and capable management. Effective management is able to direct day-to-day operations to achieve the bank's strategic goals and objectives while operating within the risk appetite. Such management has the expertise to help the board plan for the bank's future in a changing and competitive marketplace as well as generate new and innovative ideas for board

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<sup>38</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.200, "Conflicts of Interest," and 12 CFR 163.201, "Corporate Opportunity."

<sup>39</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1818, "Termination of Status as Insured Depository Institution."

<sup>40</sup> For more information, refer to 18 USC 1005, "Bank Entries, Reports, and Transactions."

<sup>41</sup> For more information, refer to 18 USC 656, "Theft, Embezzlement, or Misapplication by Bank Officer or Employee."

<sup>42</sup> For more information, refer to 18 USC 215, "Receipt of Commissions or Gifts for Procuring Loans."

<sup>43</sup> For more information, refer to 18 USC 1001, "Statements or Entries Generally."

<sup>44</sup> For more information, refer to 18 USC 1344, "Bank Fraud."

<sup>45</sup> For more information, refer to 31 USC 5322, "Criminal Penalties."

consideration. Effective management has the expertise to design and administer the systems and controls necessary to carry out the bank's strategic plan within the risk governance framework and to comply with laws and regulations.

One of the most important decisions the board makes is selecting the bank's CEO. The CEO is responsible for executing the bank's strategic plan and effectively managing the bank's risks and financial performance. The board should select and retain a CEO who has the leadership skills and the appropriate competence, experience, and integrity to carry out his or her responsibilities.

The board or a board committee should be actively engaged in the CEO selection process. The board should specifically define selection criteria, including experience, expertise, and personal character, and periodically review and update the criteria as appropriate. The CEO should share the board's corporate culture and the vision and philosophy for the bank to promote mutual trust and a close working relationship. For larger banks, a board committee, typically the governance or nominating committee, oversees the CEO selection process. This committee's responsibilities are discussed in more detail in appendix C of this booklet.

Besides selecting a qualified CEO, the board's primary responsibility is to directly oversee the CEO and senior management. In doing so, the board should

- set formal performance standards for senior management consistent with the bank's strategy and financial objectives, risk appetite and culture, and risk management practices; and monitor performance relative to the standards.
- align compensation with performance and ensure that incentive compensation arrangements do not encourage imprudent risk taking.
- oversee the talent management process, which includes establishing a succession plan to replace key senior management.
- approve diversity policies and practices consistent with identified standards.<sup>46</sup>
- meet regularly with senior management and maintain appropriate lines of communication.
- hold management accountable for providing sufficient, clear, transparent, and timely information.
- question and critically review explanations, assumptions, and information provided by senior management.

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<sup>46</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2015-30.

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- assess whether senior management's knowledge and expertise remain appropriate given the nature and complexity of the bank's strategy and risk profile.
- take decisive action to address problems or concerns with management performance or misconduct.

Banks proposing to enter into an employment contract or other written agreement regarding compensation with a prospective director, senior executive officer, or employee may be subject to additional requirements.<sup>47</sup>

The board or a designated board committee should establish a formal performance appraisal process that evaluates the CEO and other senior management. The goal of a CEO evaluation process is to enhance the relationship between the CEO and the board and improve the bank's overall performance through candid conversations about goal setting and performance measurement. The board should give constructive feedback to its CEO to help improve his or her performance in overseeing the bank. This process assists the board in discharging its responsibilities to supervise management and hold the CEO accountable. When the CEO does not fulfill board expectations, the board should be prepared to replace the CEO.

### *Succession Planning*

Succession planning can provide stability in tumultuous financial times and can lessen the influence of dominant personalities and behaviors. At smaller banks, the depth of talent available for key management positions may be limited. In these instances, smaller banks may consider increasing the formality of management training programs, development, and talent identification. Succession planning in larger banks may involve developing a talent pool of employees who have the necessary qualifications, skills, experience, and exposure to the board and senior management. These larger banks should have more formal processes to identify management succession requirements to develop and prepare individuals for various leadership positions. The bank's succession planning may also help the bank retain key employees.

Succession planning should be a regular topic of board discussion. The board should approve a management succession policy to address the loss of the CEO and other key executives. This policy should identify critical positions that would fall in the scope of a succession plan. This policy also should outline the process by which the board and management would fill vacancies created by death, illness, injury, resignation, or misconduct. If no individual in the bank is suitable, the succession policy should provide for a temporary

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<sup>47</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 359, "Golden Parachute and Indemnification Payments."

replacement to serve in the role until the board finds a successor. In addition, the board and senior management should review and update management succession plans at least annually to confirm that the plans remain viable.

The CEO is responsible for appropriate leadership development and management succession planning for major bank functions while effectively preserving the independence of audit and independent risk control functions. Managers should support succession planning by assessing their line-of-business structures as well as the bank's needs. Management also should determine the required knowledge and skills for management positions, identify the best candidates for critical jobs, and initiate development plans for those who show potential for advancement.

### Heightened Standards

The board or board committee should review and approve a written talent management program that provides for, among other things, development, recruitment, and succession planning regarding the CEO, chief audit executive, CRE, their direct reports, and other potential successors.<sup>48</sup>

### *Oversee Compensation and Benefits Arrangements*

The board should determine that compensation practices for the bank's executive officers and employees are safe and sound, are consistent with prudent compensation practices, and comply with laws and regulations governing compensation practices.<sup>49</sup>

The bank is required to maintain safeguards to prevent the payment of compensation, fees, and benefits that are excessive or that could lead to material financial loss to the bank.<sup>50</sup> If it is unreasonable or disproportionate to the services actually performed, compensation is considered excessive and is therefore prohibited as an unsafe or unsound practice.<sup>51</sup>

Given the level of authority that executive officers have over all banking activities, the board should oversee this group's compensation, including

- evaluating and approving employment contracts.
- establishing the compensation and benefits of the CEO and other executive officers.

<sup>48</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.L, "Talent Management Processes."

<sup>49</sup> For example, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, "Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safety and Soundness"; 12 CFR 359; and 12 CFR 1026.36, "Prohibited Acts or Practices and Certain Requirements for Credit Secured by a Dwelling."

<sup>50</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, II, I, "Compensation, Fees and Benefits."

<sup>51</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, III, "Prohibition on Compensation That Constitutes an Unsafe and Unsound Practice."

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- assessing the reasonableness of the structure and components of executive compensation, including various benefits related to retirement, termination, and change of control.
- confirming that the internal processes for incentive compensation arrangements are consistent with safe and sound banking principles.
- evaluating executive performance relative to board-established goals and objectives.
- considering shareholder concerns.

*Incentive Compensation*

Incentive-based compensation means any variable compensation, fees, or benefits that serve as an incentive or reward for performance. Banks of varying size may have incentive compensation arrangements. Incentive compensation arrangements should balance risk and financial results in a manner that does not encourage employees to expose their banks to imprudent risks.

Incentive compensation can be a useful tool for retaining key talent; it may, however, encourage executives and employees to take imprudent risks that are inconsistent with the bank's long-term viability and safety and soundness. Strong corporate governance, including active and effective board oversight, should support incentive compensation arrangements.

OCC Bulletin 2010-24, "Incentive Compensation: Interagency Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies," provides guidance to all banks that have incentive compensation arrangements, with expanded expectations for the largest, most complex banks.<sup>52</sup> The principles in OCC Bulletin 2010-24 apply to compensation arrangements of executive officers as well as nonexecutive personnel, collectively referred to as "covered employees," who have the ability to expose the bank to material amounts of risks. OCC Bulletin 2010-24 outlines that sound incentive compensation principles should include the following:

- Provide employees with incentives that appropriately balance risk and reward.
- Be compatible with effective controls and risk management.
- Be supported by strong corporate governance, including active and effective oversight by the bank's board.

The board is ultimately responsible for ensuring that incentive compensation arrangements for all covered employees are appropriately balanced and do not jeopardize the bank's safety and soundness. The board's oversight should

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<sup>52</sup> The largest, most complex banks are those supervised by the OCC's Large Bank Supervision department.

be commensurate with the scope and prevalence of the bank's incentive compensation arrangements. Independent directors should be actively involved in the oversight of incentive compensation arrangements.

Executive officers play a critical role in managing the overall risk-taking activities of the bank. The board should

- approve executive officers' incentive compensation arrangements.
- approve and document any material exceptions or adjustments to executive officers' incentive compensation arrangements.
- consider and monitor the effects of approved exceptions on the balance of the arrangements, the risk-taking incentives of senior executives, and the safety and soundness of the bank.
- monitor incentive compensation payments to senior executives and the sensitivity of these payments to risk results.
- obtain sufficient information to monitor and review any clawback provisions to determine if the provision was triggered and executed as planned.

In larger banks, the board's oversight of compensation matters is typically handled by a board compensation committee, as discussed in appendix C of this booklet.

### *Employee Benefits*

"Employee benefits" is an umbrella term that refers to non-wage compensation provided to employees in addition to their normal wages or salaries.

A comprehensive employee benefits package is an important, competitive, and useful tool for attracting and retaining employees. In addition, there may be tax advantages for the bank for establishing certain employee benefits, such as a retirement plan. On the other hand, offering employee benefits can be costly. Administrative costs can be high and may increase year-to-year. There is also the risk of liability from lawsuits and the payment of regulatory fines from mistakes made in benefits administration.

There are two types of employee benefits, mandated and optional. By law, banks must provide mandated benefits. The mandated benefits include Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation. Optional benefits are not mandated. If offered, however, optional benefits may be subject to certain requirements. If requirements are not met, the bank could incur lawsuits, penalties, and excise taxes. Optional benefits include

- group health plans.
- disability insurance.
- life insurance.

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- retirement plans.
- flexible compensation (cafeteria plans).
- leave.

The board ultimately should be responsible for all decisions relating to the cost and scope of the bank's employee benefits. The board also should be responsible for overseeing management's administration of benefits and fulfillment of fiduciary responsibilities. If the board determines the bank should provide its employees with a group health plan or a retirement plan, then the board should ensure the bank's fiduciary responsibilities are met.<sup>53</sup>

Senior management is responsible for establishing an appropriate organizational structure to administer benefits. Management often outsources benefits administration to benefits professionals or may use an internal administrative committee or human resources department to manage some or all employee benefit operations.

### *Maintain Appropriate Affiliate and Holding Company Relationships*

In the case of affiliated banks and holding companies, the strategic objectives, corporate values, and corporate governance principles of the affiliated bank should align with the holding company. A bank managed as part of a holding company structure can face additional challenges if directors serve on both the holding company board and the bank board. For example, this arrangement may create conflicts of interest or force directors to act on competing priorities. The bank's board should ensure the interests of the bank are not subordinate to the interests of the parent holding company in decisions that may adversely affect the bank's risk profile, financial condition, safety and soundness, and compliance with laws and regulations.<sup>54</sup> Additionally, a director who serves on the board of both the bank and its holding company must comply with the director's fiduciary duties to the bank, including the duty of loyalty.

The primary duty of a subsidiary bank's board is to ensure the bank operates in a safe and sound manner. The subsidiary bank's board should ensure that relationships between the bank and its affiliates and

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<sup>53</sup> For more information, refer to the "Retirement Plan Products and Services" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*, which contains a detailed discussion of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and its fiduciary standards.

<sup>54</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 371c, "Banking Affiliates"; 12 USC 371c-1, "Restrictions on Transactions with Affiliates"; 12 CFR 31; and 12 CFR 223, "Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates (Regulation W)." For more information on national banks, affiliates, and other related organizations, refer to the "Related Organizations" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. For FSAs, refer to section 730, "Related Organizations," of the *Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) Examination Handbook*.

subsidiaries do not pose safety and soundness issues for the bank and are appropriately managed. The bank's board should carefully review holding company policies that affect the bank to confirm that those policies adequately serve the bank. If the bank's board is concerned that the holding company is engaging in practices that may harm the bank or are otherwise inappropriate, the bank's board should notify the holding company and obtain modifications. If the holding company board does not address concerns of the bank's board, bank directors should dissent on the record and consider actions to protect the bank's interests. If necessary, the bank's board should hire an independent legal counsel or accountant. The bank's board also may raise its concerns with its regulators.

### *Establish and Maintain an Appropriate Board Structure*

Board committees are an important component of the corporate and risk governance structure. Board committees help the board carry out oversight duties and responsibilities. Delegation of work to a committee can enhance board effectiveness by enabling the board, through its committees, to cover a wider range of issues with greater depth of analysis. Delegation also allows the directors to better focus their time and attention on areas or subject matters on which they can lend their specific expertise or experience. Committee meetings can encourage directors to thoroughly consider issues, promote more candid discussions, and gain better insight into the bank's activities.

The board should clearly understand and define the responsibilities of each committee. Each committee should have a written charter that outlines the committee's responsibilities, member qualifications, authorities, independence, and board reporting. The charter should establish requirements that include meeting frequency, conduct, attendance, minutes, and use of advisors. The charter also should address the need for an annual performance evaluation of the committee. The board should approve and disclose the written charter, as appropriate. Disclosure of the committee charters (for example, on websites, in proxy statements, and in policy manuals) improves the transparency of the board's decision-making processes.

The appropriate governance and committee structure depends on the bank's needs and is another key board decision. As the complexity and risk profile of the bank's products and services increase, additional committees may be necessary for the board to provide effective oversight. Similarly, additional skills and expertise of committee members might be needed. Conversely, too many committees can create competing demands and the potential for duplication and confusion about responsibilities.

Directors should be assigned to committees that align with their skills and experience. In some circumstances, directors are required to have

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specific qualifications to serve on certain committees.<sup>55</sup> Participation on multiple committees should be balanced with time commitments to avoid overburdening any single director. Some overlap, however, is beneficial in integrating board activities. With smaller boards, directors likely need to serve on multiple committees. Periodically rotating committee membership may help to achieve optimal objectivity, but frequent rotation can sometimes adversely affect the knowledge base and effectiveness of committee members. The board should find the right balance between maintaining institutional knowledge and gaining new perspectives.

The board's responsibility is to determine which committees it needs to effectively govern the bank. The committees vary by bank. Some committees are mandated by laws or regulations. Appendix C, "Common Board Committees," of this booklet describes some key committees.

*Perform Board Self-Assessments*

A meaningful self-assessment evaluates the board's effectiveness and functionality, board committee operations, and directors' skills and expertise. All boards should periodically undertake some form of self-assessment. Board self-assessments can be valuable in improving the board's overall performance. Further, by acknowledging that the board holds itself responsible for its performance, self-assessments help affirm the "tone at the top."

Self-assessments may take the form of questionnaires to all directors, a group self-assessment, formal interviews with each director, peer evaluations, or a combination of these methods. In some circumstances, it may be worthwhile to use an independent third party to administer the self-assessments and provide feedback to the directors.

A board self-assessment addresses the effectiveness of the board's structure, activities, and oversight, including factors such as

- director qualifications.
- level of director participation.
- quality of board meetings and discussions, including whether one director or a group of directors dominates the discussion.
- quality and timeliness of board materials and information.
- relevance and comprehensiveness of meeting agendas.
- the board's relationship with the CEO, including whether the relationship is supportive but independent.

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<sup>55</sup> For example, refer to 12 CFR 363.5, "Audit Committees," for regulatory requirements regarding the composition of audit committees for banks with consolidated total assets greater than \$500 million.

- effectiveness of credible challenge.
- effectiveness of strategic and succession planning.
- effectiveness of executive sessions.
- effectiveness of board committees and committee structure.

An important component of any assessment is to follow up on action items identified to improve performance. The action items should produce measurable results. The board or a designated committee should oversee the implementation of recommendations arising from board self-assessments and independent assessments. As part of its oversight duties, the committee may determine that board composition changes are needed to address skill and competency gaps.

### Heightened Standards

A covered bank's board should conduct an annual self-assessment that includes an evaluation of the board's effectiveness in meeting the standards applicable to the board.<sup>56</sup>

### *Oversee Financial Performance and Risk Reporting*

Sound financial performance is a key indicator of the bank's success. The board is responsible for overseeing financial performance and risk reporting. As such, the board should determine the types of reports required to help with its oversight and decision-making responsibilities.<sup>57</sup> The reports should be accurate, timely, relevant, complete, and succinct. Refer to the "Management Information Systems" section in this booklet for more information. The information requirements, particularly the number and variety of reports, depend on the bank's size, complexity, and risks. The information should be sufficient to keep relevant parties informed of the financial condition and performance of all the bank's material lines of business. In addition, information requirements should evolve as the bank grows in size and complexity and as the bank's environment or strategic goals change.

Reports presented to the board should highlight important performance measures, trends, and variances rather than presenting the information as raw data. Some banks use dashboard-style reports to communicate the risk and performance indicators to the board.

<sup>56</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, III.

<sup>57</sup> For more information on the types of reports and measures the board uses to assist in its oversight responsibilities, refer to *Director's Reference Guide to Board Reports and Information*.

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Performance and risk reports should enable the board to

- understand the drivers of financial performance.
- understand and evaluate the potential impact of business units and their risk on financial performance.
- assess the adequacy of capital, liquidity, and earnings.
- monitor performance trends and projections.
- monitor financial performance against strategic goals.
- monitor risk positions in relation to the risk appetite, limits, and parameters.
- monitor the types, volumes, and impacts of exceptions to policies and operating procedures.
- understand model risks and reliance.
- assess the impact of new, modified, or expanded products or services.
- assess evolving risks related to changing technologies and market conditions.
- monitor risks related to third-party relationships involving critical activities.
- assess potential litigation costs and reserves.

Useful performance reports are likely to include, but are not limited to, the following information:

- Financial statements and peer comparison reports
- Budget variance reports
- Metrics on key risks
- Asset quality indicators and trends
- Allowance for loan and lease losses analysis
- Concentrations of credit
- Liquidity position and trends and contingency funding plans
- Interest rate sensitivity analyses
- Performance metrics for new, modified, or expanded products and services
- Outsourced critical activities
- Off-balance-sheet activity and exposures, including derivative exposures
- Growth rates and projections
- Capital position, trends, and capital adequacy assessments
- Key business unit performance
- Policy exception monitoring reports
- Performance measurements and metrics for risk appetite, performance goals, and strategic goals
- Earnings trends and quality, including non-interest income and expenses

### *Support Efforts to Serve Community Credit Needs*

Banks have a responsibility to help meet the credit needs of their communities, consistent with safe and sound lending practices,<sup>58</sup> and an obligation to provide fair access and equal treatment to all bank customers.<sup>59</sup> The CRA is intended to prevent redlining and to encourage banks to help meet the credit needs of the communities they serve, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.<sup>60</sup>

The board should understand management's involvement in the community and should develop a high-level understanding of what activities meet the requirements of the CRA to ensure that strategic plans consider activities that qualify under the CRA. As part of its governance responsibilities, the board should work toward fulfilling the credit needs of the bank's community, including unmet or underserved banking needs.

Management should maintain a constructive dialogue with community members. This dialogue helps management and the board better understand where community needs are not being adequately addressed and what role the bank might play in helping to meet those needs. Significant strategic and compliance risks and exposure to litigation exist when banks do not help meet the credit needs of their communities consistent with safe and sound lending practices or when they do not provide fair and equal treatment to all bank customers. A failure to do so can adversely affect the bank's expansion plans to acquire branches or other banks.

## **Individual Responsibilities of Directors**

Each director has individual responsibilities and should meet these responsibilities when overseeing the bank's operations.

### *Attend and Participate in Board and Committee Meetings*

Directors should demonstrate a willingness and ability to prepare for, attend, and participate in all board and committee meetings to make a sound contribution to the oversight function. Directors should attend meetings as often as possible. A director's time commitment should be sufficient to stay informed about the bank's risks, business and operational

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<sup>58</sup> Refer to 12 USC 2901 et seq., "Community Reinvestment."

<sup>59</sup> Refer to 15 USC 45(a)(1); 15 USC 1691(a), "Activities Constituting Discrimination"; 42 USC 3604, "Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Housing and Other Prohibited Practices"; 42 USC 3605, "Discrimination in Residential Real Estate-Related Transactions."

<sup>60</sup> For more information on national banks and CSAs, refer to the "Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. For FSAs, refer to section 1500, "Community Reinvestment Act," of the *OTS Examination Handbook*.

## Corporate Governance

performance, and competitive position in the marketplace. The time commitment is generally a function of the bank's size and complexity as well as the committee work required of the director.

Board meetings should be focused and productive by following agendas that permit adequate time for presentation and discussion of material issues. The thoughtful preparation of an agenda for each board meeting should provide directors with reasonable assurance that all important matters are brought to their attention. While the agenda should be carefully planned, it should be flexible enough to accommodate unexpected developments. The board should have a process for soliciting potential agenda items from individual directors and from others within the bank.

*Request and Review Meeting Materials*

The board should work with management to determine what information the board needs at meetings to monitor the bank's operations, make decisions, and oversee the bank's compliance with laws and regulations. Information should give directors a complete and accurate overview of the bank's condition, activities, and issues. Management is responsible for being transparent and providing information in a concise and meaningful format. Reports to the board should be subject to periodic audits to validate the integrity of the information.

Directors should be provided with information from a variety of sources, including management, board committees, outside experts and advisors, risk management and compliance personnel, and internal and external auditors. The board should agree on a set of key performance measurements and risk indicators that are tracked at each board meeting. For the board to effectively oversee the bank's adherence to the agreed-upon strategy and risk appetite, directors should have sufficient information about the bank's material risks, including emerging risks.

Directors should receive the information in advance of their meetings so there is sufficient time to review the information, reflect on key issues, prepare for discussion, and request supplemental information as necessary. The board meeting materials should be kept confidential because of the sensitive nature of the information.

The chair or lead director should periodically review the content of the meeting materials with the other directors and provide useful feedback to management. For example, instead of being inundated with technical detail, the board might request that all pre-meeting reading materials include one- to two-page executive summaries, as well as questions the directors should be prepared to address at meetings. When feasible, directors might also have access to secure online analytical tools that allow

them to review additional information as needed or compare the bank's performance with a custom peer group and established benchmarks.

### *Make Decisions and Seek Explanations*

The board's decision-making process should include constructive, credible challenge to the information and views provided by management. The ability to provide credible challenge is predicated on the qualifications of the directors and receipt of accurate, complete, and timely information. The quality of information received by the directors affects their ability to perform the board oversight function effectively. If a director is unable to make an informed decision because of inadequate information provided by management, the decision should be postponed until sufficient information is provided and the board has additional time to discuss and review the information. If this is a recurring problem, the board should review the format of board proceedings or management's responsiveness to director inquiries. Directors should take the initiative to address potential problems.

Effective directors ask incisive questions and require accurate, timely, and honest answers. Effective directors also demonstrate a commitment to the bank, its business plan, and long-term shareholder value. In addition, they are open to other opinions and are willing to raise tough questions in a manner that encourages a constructive and engaging boardroom atmosphere.

### *Review and Approve Policies*

Policies set standards and courses of action to achieve specific goals and objectives established by the board. The directors should approve a clear set of policies that guides management and staff in the operation and administration of the bank. The policies should cover all key areas of the bank's operations. Policies should be consistent with the bank's goals, risk appetite, and regulatory requirements. Furthermore, certain statutes and regulations require written policies governing specific activities or programs. Refer to appendix B of this booklet for a list of policies and programs subject to board approval.

The board or its designated committees should periodically review policies and oversee revisions. As appropriate, the board should approve risk limits for specific policies and monitor the limits periodically. If exceptions to a particular policy are approaching or breaching risk limits, the board should take appropriate action, which includes assessing the policy, risk appetite, or strategy. Adjustments to the strategy may include a slowdown of growth, placing a temporary moratorium on activities, or exiting the line of business. The board should modify bank policies when necessary

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to respond to significant changes in the bank's resources, activities, or business conditions. The board also should specify means to measure and monitor compliance with board-approved policies.

*Exercise Independent Judgment*

Independence is the core of effective board oversight. The board should exercise independent judgment in carrying out its responsibilities. Each director should examine and consider management's recommendations thoroughly but exercise independent judgment. Effective credible challenge among directors is healthy and can suggest that the board is independent and not operating under undue influence by management or from an individual director.

To promote objectivity and impartiality, the bank should have a conflict of interest policy that provides clear independence standards and conflict of interest guidelines for its directors. This policy should provide sufficient guidance to address behaviors or activities that may diminish directors' ability to make objective decisions and act in the best interests of the institution. Directors should also structure their business and personal dealings with the bank to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest. Such dealings must comply with legal and regulatory requirements. The policy should also describe situations when directors must abstain from decision making. Conflicts of interest should be promptly reported to the board.<sup>61</sup> Refer to the "Establish an Appropriate Corporate Culture" section in this booklet for more information.

To strengthen board independence, the independent directors should convene executive sessions as needed. Executive sessions allow the independent directors to discuss the effectiveness of management, the quality of board meetings, and other issues or concerns without the potential influence of management. Executive sessions make it easier for independent directors to ask questions, express unpopular opinions, and test their instincts without the risk of being seen as uninformed or undermining the CEO's authority. Executive sessions also can provide a forum for director training and meetings with advisors and regulators.

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<sup>61</sup> For more information, refer to the "Insider Activities" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

# Planning

The board sets the bank's strategic focus and significant goals and provides the necessary oversight for the bank to have the personnel as well as the financial, technological, and organizational capabilities to achieve those goals. Because of ongoing changes in the banking industry, a bank should have a clear strategic plan as well as operational plans.

## Strategic Planning

A strategic plan defines the bank's long-term goals and its strategy for achieving those goals. The bank should have a strategic planning process that results in a board-approved, written strategic plan. The strategic plan should be consistent with the bank's risk appetite, capital plan, and liquidity requirements.

The bank's strategic planning process should answer the following four questions for the board and senior management:

1. Where are we now? Senior management should evaluate the bank's internal and external environment and its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The internal review identifies the bank's strengths and weaknesses. The external analysis helps to recognize threats and opportunities including regulatory, economic, competitive, and technological matters.
2. Where do we want to be? Senior management should establish or confirm the bank's missions, goals, and objectives. A mission statement should reflect the bank's purpose and values. Goals are general statements about what should be achieved and stem from the mission and the board's vision. Objectives are statements of specific, measurable tasks that the bank, board, management, or staff needs to perform to reach its goals.
3. How do we get there? Senior management should design the bank's strategic plan to achieve the bank's goals and objectives. The plan should be tailored to fit the bank's internal capabilities and business environment. An effective plan should be based on realistic assumptions, consider the associated risks, and be aligned with the bank's risk appetite. The plan should take into account the resources needed to reach the bank's goals and objectives, as well as potential effect on earnings, capital, and liquidity. Technology requirements and constraints also should be considered.

## Planning

4. How do we measure our progress? Regular measurement and reporting on the bank's objectives keep the board and senior management focused on whether the bank is achieving established goals in the strategic plan. A periodic progress report or scorecard should indicate whether timelines and objectives are being met and if additional or alternative actions need to be implemented.

As the bank grows in size and complexity and its risk profile increases, the process should become more formalized. A formalized process should define the board's and management's roles and responsibilities, indicate timing and frequency of activities, and establish monitoring activities.

Typically, the strategic plan spans a three- to five-year period and includes the bank's goals and the objectives to achieve those goals. Strategic planning should be linked to the bank's risk management and capital planning processes. The strategic plan should be consistent with the board's articulated risk appetite and liquidity requirements as well as the bank's capital base. The strategic plan should be dynamic; as changes occur, planning and implementation should be adjusted to reflect current conditions. If the bank is a subsidiary of a holding company, the board may consider developing one consolidated strategic plan. Continuous monitoring of activities should allow management to measure the actual and potential risks associated with achieving the bank's strategic goals and objectives and the board to monitor progress. This monitoring includes whenever the bank introduces new, expanded, or modified products and services. When the bank engages in merger or acquisition activities, it should perform a retrospective review of the merger's or acquisition's success. The retrospective review should consider the impact on financial performance, information technology (IT) infrastructure, system integration, and human resources.

The board is responsible for overseeing the bank's strategic planning process and management's implementation of the resulting strategic plan. During the planning phase, the board should provide a credible challenge to management's assumptions and recommendations. The board should understand the risks associated with the success and failure of the plan. With the help of progress reports, the board should carefully monitor and assess the strategic plan. The board should ensure that management actions and decisions remain consistent with the bank's strategic plan. In addition, the board should recognize whether the bank has a reasonable strategy and, if not, challenge management's decisions, drive sustainable corrective actions, or change the strategic direction, as appropriate. The board should require management to have a contingency plan if the original plan fails to achieve its objectives.

Senior management, in consultation with the board and business line managers, should develop a strategic planning process that results in a board-approved, written strategic plan. Management is responsible for implementing the bank's strategic plan, developing policies and processes to guide the plan's execution, and monitoring the plan's implementation. Reports should include outcomes, key performance indicators, and key risk indicators that are compared with established targets and risk limits.

### Heightened Standards

The CEO should be responsible for developing a written strategic plan with input from frontline units, IRM, and internal audit. The board should evaluate and approve the strategic plan and monitor management's efforts to implement the strategic plan at least annually.

The strategic plan should cover, at a minimum, a three-year period and

- contain a comprehensive assessment of risks that have an impact on the covered bank or that could have an impact on the covered bank during the period covered by the strategic plan.
- articulate an overall mission statement and strategic objectives for the covered bank and include an explanation of how the covered bank will achieve those objectives.
- explain how the covered bank will update, as necessary, the risk governance framework to account for changes in the covered bank's risk profile projected under the strategic plan.
- be reviewed, updated, and approved, as necessary, due to changes in the covered bank's risk profile or operating environment that were not contemplated when the strategic plan was developed.<sup>62</sup>

## New Activities

A key consideration in the bank's strategic planning process is growth and new profit opportunities for the bank. These opportunities include expanding existing products and services and introducing new ones. To stay relevant in a rapidly changing and evolving financial service industry, the bank should adapt as customer demographics, needs, and demands evolve. Remaining nimble may lead to opportunities for growth in new lines of business.

New activities, including new, modified, or expanded products and services, often require infrastructure support, expertise, substantial lead time, and significant financial investment. As such, management and the board should understand the impact of new activities on the bank's financial performance, strategic planning process, risk profile, banking

<sup>62</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.D, "Strategic Plan."

## Planning

model, and ability to remain competitive.<sup>63</sup> Insufficient planning could lead to an incomplete assessment and understanding of associated risks involved with new activities and may result in inadequate oversight and control.

The board should oversee management's implementation of the risk management system for new activities, including execution of control programs and the audit of such activities. Management should design an effective risk management system when developing and implementing new activities that includes adequate due diligence; policies, procedures, and controls; change management; and, performance and monitoring. Specifically, management should

- clearly understand the rationale for engaging in new activities and how proposed new activities meet the bank's strategic objectives.
- establish and implement policies and procedures that provide guidance on risk management of new activities.
- have effective change management processes to manage and control the implementation of new or modified operational processes, as well as the addition of new technologies into the bank's existing technology architecture.
- have appropriate performance and monitoring systems, including management information systems (MIS), to assess whether the activities meet operational and strategic expectations and legal requirements and are within the bank's risk appetite.

While all banks should include these components in their risk management system for new activities, the sophistication of the risk management system should reflect the bank's size, complexity, and risk profile. The bank's risk management system should evolve to be sufficiently robust to keep pace with additional complexities and planned activities. Depending on the bank's size, complexity, and risk profile, the bank's board or management may consider establishing senior management positions or independent risk committees that include internal stakeholders from business units and other ad hoc members with expertise in applicable functions to oversee new activities.

## Capital Planning

Capital planning is essential for a bank's safe and sound operations and viability.<sup>64</sup> Banks are expected to have capital commensurate with the nature and extent of their risks as well as their current and anticipated

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<sup>63</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2017-43, "New, Modified, or Expanded Bank Products and Services: Risk Management Principles."

<sup>64</sup> For more information on capital planning and stress testing, refer to the "Capital and Dividends" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

needs. Because raising capital normally becomes more difficult and expensive when the bank has problems, any capital raising events should begin before major issues materialize. The board and senior management should regularly assess capital to ensure that levels remain adequate, not just at one point in time, but over time.

Capital planning is a dynamic and continuous process that should be forward-looking. The capital planning process and the resulting capital plan should evolve as the bank's overall risks, activities, and risk management practices change. The most effective capital planning considers short- and long-term capital needs over at least three years. In addition, capital planning should align with the bank's strategic planning process. The content and depth of the bank's capital planning process should be commensurate with the overall risks, complexity, and corporate structure. For example, mutual savings associations build capital almost exclusively through retained earnings, so they have very limited means to increase capital quickly. Capital planning is critical for a federal mutual savings association.

Stress testing is an important element of the capital planning process. Banks can use stress testing to establish and support a reasonable risk appetite and limits, set concentration limits, adjust strategies, and appropriately plan for and maintain adequate capital levels.

## Operational Planning

The planning process begins with developing a strategic plan. The responsibility for establishing and implementing operational plans and budgets to meet strategic plans rests with the CEO and management. Operational plans flow logically from the strategic plan by translating long-term goals into specific, measurable targets. The board should approve the operational plans after concluding that they are realistic and compatible with the bank's risk appetite and strategic objectives.

Operational plans are narrower in scope than strategic plans, have more detail, are in effect for shorter periods of time, and provide the means of monitoring progress toward achieving strategic goals. Common examples of operational plans are budgets, annual staffing, marketing, liquidity,<sup>65</sup> and contingency plans. The size and complexity of the bank's operations, as well as the bank's risk appetite, are important considerations when reviewing the level of formality and depth of the operational planning process.

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<sup>65</sup> For more information on liquidity planning, refer to the "Liquidity" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

## Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Planning

Disruptions to operations can result in loss of bank premises or systems supporting customer activities, such as online and mobile applications. Sound business continuity plans allow banks to respond to such adverse events as natural disasters, technology failures, cyber threats, human error, and terrorism. Banks should be able to restore information systems, operations, and customer services quickly and reliably after any adverse event. Banks therefore should have resilient business operations and minimize customer service disruptions.<sup>66</sup>

Banks' business continuity plans should forecast how departure from a business routine caused by a major operational loss could affect customer services or bank resources. Business continuity plans should address backup procedures, alternate facilities, and business resumption processes.

The board should review and approve adequate disaster recovery and business continuity plans at least annually. The board should also oversee implementation and approve policies relating to disaster recovery and business continuity. Additionally, the board should ensure management continually updates the business continuity plan to reflect the current operating environment and adequately tests the plan to confirm its viability.

Senior management is responsible for establishing and implementing policies and procedures and defining responsibilities for bank-wide business continuity planning. Management should document, maintain, and test the bank's business continuity plan and backup systems periodically to mitigate the consequences of system failures, natural and other disasters, and unauthorized intrusions. Management also should report the tests of the plan and backup systems to the board annually.

## Information Technology and Information Security

Banks are critically dependent on their information and technology assets, such as hardware, software, and data. Management should protect information and technology assets for operational continuity, financial viability, and the trust of customers. The unauthorized loss, destruction, or disclosure of confidential information can adversely affect the bank's earnings and capital.

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<sup>66</sup> For more information, refer to the "Business Continuity Management" booklet of the *FFIEC IT Examination Handbook*.

Interagency guidelines address standards for developing and implementing administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information.<sup>67</sup> The guidelines also discuss assigning specific responsibility for implementing an information security program and reviewing reports from management.

Based on the guidelines, the board should oversee management's development, implementation, and maintenance of a comprehensive, written information security program. The guidelines require the board or a board committee to approve the bank's written information security program at least annually.

Management should develop an information system program to protect the security and confidentiality of customer information. A robust risk assessment drives the information security program. The risk assessment provides guidance for the selection and implementation of security controls and the timing and nature of testing those controls.

Banks may employ a chief information officer, a chief information security officer, a chief operating officer, or a chief technology officer. Titles and positions vary depending on the bank's structure, size, and complexity. This designated individual or individuals (chief information officer, chief information security officer, chief operating officer, or chief technology officer) should provide periodic updates on the bank's IT infrastructure, operations, and information security-related risks to the board.

## Recovery Planning

A recovery plan's purpose is to provide a covered bank<sup>68</sup> with a framework to effectively and efficiently address the financial effects of severe stress events and avoid failure or resolution.<sup>69</sup> A recovery plan's components should generally draw from and should align with other risk management processes, such as those governing capital, liquidity, stress testing, business continuity, or resolution planning. An effective recovery plan helps the management of a covered bank identify when the covered bank is or may be encountering a severe stress event that threatens or may threaten its financial strength and viability. In such an event, the recovery plan should

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<sup>67</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix B, "Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards," and the "Information Security" booklet of the *FFIEC IT Examination Handbook*.

<sup>68</sup> "Covered Bank" is defined at 12 CFR 30, appendix E, E.3.

<sup>69</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix E, "OCC Guidelines Establishing Standards for Recovery Planning by Certain Large Insured National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches," and the "Recovery Planning" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. Refer also to 83 Fed. Reg. 66604.

## Planning

prompt management to take appropriate actions to restore the bank's financial strength and viability. The recovery plan is important to the bank's resilience, should be integrated into the bank's risk governance framework, and should play an important role in crisis management. The recovery plan should recognize the bank's transitions from business as usual to early warning of severe stress to severe stress, and it should be linked to the resolution plan in the event that financial deterioration is not rectified.

The covered bank's recovery planning process should be ongoing. The process should complement the covered bank's risk governance functions and support its safe and sound operation. The process of developing and maintaining a recovery plan should cause the covered bank's management and board to enhance their focus on risk governance with a view toward lessening the financial impact of future unforeseen events.

# Risk Governance

Risk governance, which is part of the corporate governance framework, is the bank’s approach to risk management. Risk governance applies the principles of sound corporate governance to the identification, measurement, monitoring, and controlling of risks. Risk governance helps ensure risk-taking activities are in line with the bank’s strategy and risk appetite. Key components of risk governance include the risk culture, the risk appetite, and the bank’s risk management system.

A risk governance framework, as shown in figure 1, is an essential component in effectively managing the bank’s enterprise-wide risks.<sup>70</sup> The framework is the means by which the board and management, in their respective roles,

- establish and reinforce the bank’s risk culture.
- articulate and monitor adherence to the risk appetite.
- establish a risk management system with three lines of defense to identify, measure, monitor, and control risks.

**Figure 1:** Risk Governance Framework



<sup>70</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D.II.

The framework should cover all risk categories applicable to the bank—credit, interest rate, liquidity, price, operational, compliance, and strategic. These categories of risk and their risk to the bank's financial condition and resilience are discussed in the "Bank Supervision Process" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. Risk governance frameworks vary among banks. Banks should have a risk governance framework commensurate with the sophistication of the bank's operations and business strategies.

### Heightened Standards

A covered bank should establish and adhere to a formal written risk governance framework designed by IRM and approved by the board or the board's risk committee.<sup>71</sup> The risk governance framework should include delegations of authority from the board to management committees and executive officers as well as the risk limits established for material activities.<sup>72</sup> IRM should review and update the risk governance framework at least annually and as often as needed to address improvements in industry risk management practices and changes in the covered bank's risk profile caused by emerging risks, its strategic plans, or other internal and external factors.<sup>73</sup> As a general matter, a covered bank board may adopt the parent company's risk governance framework, if the parent company's framework meets the applicable regulatory standards and the risk profiles of the parent company and covered bank are substantially the same.<sup>74</sup>

## Risk Culture

Risk culture is the shared values, attitudes, competencies, and behaviors throughout the bank that shape and influence governance practices and risk decisions. As a subset of corporate culture, risk culture pertains to the bank's risk approach and is critical to a sound risk governance framework. To promote a sound risk culture

- the board should take the lead in establishing the tone at the top by promoting risk awareness within a sound risk culture. The board should convey its expectations to all employees that the board does not support excessive risk taking and that all employees are responsible for operating within the established risk appetite and limits.
- senior management should implement and reinforce a sound risk culture and provide incentives that reward appropriate behavior and penalize inappropriate behavior. Management should recognize, escalate, and address material risks and risk-taking activities exceeding the risk appetite in a timely manner.

<sup>71</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.A, "Risk Governance Framework."

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, I, "Introduction."

## Risk Appetite

The bank's risk appetite is another essential component of an effective risk governance framework and reinforces the risk culture. The bank's risk appetite is the aggregate level and types of risk that the board and management are willing to assume to achieve the bank's goals, objectives, and operating plan, consistent with applicable capital, liquidity, and other requirements. The development of a risk appetite should be driven by both top-down board leadership and bottom-up management involvement. Successful implementation depends on effective interactions among the board, senior management, IRM, and frontline units.

The board's role is to review and approve the bank's risk appetite and risk limits, including concentration limits. The risk appetite should be communicated throughout the bank. For larger, more complex banks, the board should have a written statement that outlines the risk appetite. The board should reevaluate and approve the risk appetite at least annually.

Senior management, in consultation with the board, develops the risk appetite. Senior management's responsibility is to execute the strategic, capital, and operating plans within the board-approved risk appetite and established limits. Consistent with the board-approved risk appetite, senior management should

- establish, in consultation with the board, risk limits for specific risk categories, business units, and lines of business (e.g., concentration limits).<sup>75</sup>
- establish appropriate metrics for measuring and monitoring risk results.
- develop timely, accurate, and transparent MIS and reports regarding risks, across the institution as well as up to the board and senior management.
- report and develop action plans, when appropriate, when limits are approached or breached.
- establish a process for material weaknesses or problems to be escalated to the appropriate level of management or the board (without fear of retribution), the CRE, and the risk committee or designated committee, as appropriate.

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<sup>75</sup> In smaller, less complex banks, the board, instead of senior management, may approve business line risk limits and concentrations.

### Heightened Standards

A covered bank should have a comprehensive written statement that articulates the bank's risk appetite and serves as the basis for the risk governance framework. The risk appetite statement provides the basis for the common understanding and communication of risk throughout the bank. The risk appetite statement should include both qualitative components and quantitative limits. The qualitative components should describe a safe and sound risk culture and how the bank will assess and accept risks, including those that are difficult to quantify. Quantitative limits should incorporate sound stress testing processes and address the bank's earnings, capital, and liquidity.<sup>76</sup> To be effective, the bank's risk appetite statement must be communicated and implemented throughout the bank.<sup>77</sup>

The board or its risk committee should review and approve the bank's risk appetite statement at least annually or more frequently, as warranted, based on the size and volatility of risks, and any material changes in the covered bank's business model, strategy, risk profile, or market conditions.<sup>78</sup>

The risk appetite statement should be communicated to all employees in a manner that causes all employees to align their risk-taking decisions with applicable aspects of the bank's risk appetite statement. IRM should establish and adhere to enterprise policies that include concentration risk limits. These policies should state how aggregate risks are effectively identified, measured, monitored, and controlled, consistent with the bank's risk appetite statement. Frontline units and IRM have monitoring and reporting responsibilities.<sup>79</sup>

## Risk Management System

The bank's risk management system comprises its policies, processes, personnel, and control systems. A sound risk management system identifies, measures, monitors, and controls risks. Because market conditions and company structures vary, no single risk management system works for all banks. The sophistication of the risk management system should be commensurate with the bank's size, complexity, and risk profile.

A common risk management system used in many banks, formally or informally, involves three lines of defense: (1) frontline units, business units, or functions that create risk; (2) IRM, loan review, compliance officer, and chief credit officer to assess risk independent of the units that create risk; and (3) internal audit, which provides independent assurance.

<sup>76</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.E, "Risk Appetite Statement."

<sup>77</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.G, "Risk Appetite Review, Monitoring, and Communication Processes."

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.E and II.G.

1. The first line of defense is the frontline units, business units, or functions that create risk. These groups are accountable for assessing and managing that risk. These groups are the bank's primary risk takers and are responsible for implementing effective internal controls and maintaining processes for identifying, assessing, controlling, and mitigating the risks associated with their activities consistent with the bank's established risk appetite and risk limits.
2. The second line of defense is commonly referred to as IRM, which oversees risk taking and assesses risks independent of the frontline units, business units, or functions that create risk. IRM complements the frontline unit's risk-taking activities through its monitoring and reporting responsibilities, including compliance with the bank's risk appetite. IRM also provides input into key risk decisions. Additionally, IRM is responsible for identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling aggregate and emerging risks enterprise-wide. In some banks, the second line of defense is less formal and includes such functions and roles as loan review, a compliance officer, or a chief credit officer.
3. The third line of defense is internal audit, which provides independent assurance to the board on the effectiveness of governance, risk management, and internal controls. Internal audit may be in-house, outsourced, or co-sourced.

While many banks have not formally adopted the three lines of defense, most banks have the basic elements. In smaller, noncomplex banks, risk management processes and internal controls are often integrated in the frontline units. In larger banks, the three lines of defense are more clearly defined and visible. In these banks, IRM is under the direction of a CRE or equivalent. The board or risk committee should be involved in the selection, oversight, and dismissal of the CRE. The CRE should have unfettered access to the board or board committees to discuss risk concerns identified through risk management activities.

### Heightened Standards

The risk governance framework should include well-defined risk management roles and responsibilities for frontline units, IRM, and internal audit.<sup>80</sup> Frontline units should assess, on an ongoing basis, the material risks associated with their activities.<sup>81</sup> IRM should oversee the covered bank's risk-taking activities; assess risk and issues independent of frontline units; and identify and assess concentrations across the bank and material aggregate risks.<sup>82</sup>

Internal audit should, among other things, ensure that the covered bank's risk governance framework complies with the applicable regulatory standards and is appropriate for the bank's size, complexity, and risk profile. Internal audit should maintain a complete and current inventory of all the covered bank's material processes, product lines, services, and functions, and assess the risks, including emerging risks, associated with each, which collectively provide a basis for the audit plan.<sup>83</sup>

A covered bank's board should actively oversee the covered bank's risk-taking activities and hold management accountable for adhering to the risk governance framework. In providing active oversight, the board may rely on risk assessments and reports prepared by IRM and internal audit to support the board's ability to question, challenge, and, when necessary, oppose recommendations and decisions made by management that could cause the covered bank's risk profile to exceed its risk appetite or jeopardize the safety and soundness of the covered bank.<sup>84</sup>

Within a sound risk management system, the bank should have internal controls and information systems that are appropriate to the bank's size and the nature, scope, and risk of the bank's activities.<sup>85</sup>

Regardless of the bank's size and complexity, a sound risk management system should identify, measure, monitor, and control risk. A risk management system comprises policies, processes, personnel, and control systems. All of these elements are essential to an effective risk management system. If any of these areas are deficient, the bank's risk management may also be deficient.

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<sup>80</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.C, "Roles and Responsibilities."

<sup>81</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.C.1, "Role and Responsibilities of Front Line Units."

<sup>82</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.C.2, "Role and Responsibilities of Independent Risk Management."

<sup>83</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.C.3, "Role and Responsibilities of Internal Audit."

<sup>84</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, III.B.

<sup>85</sup> For more information on national banks, refer to the "Internal Control" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. For FSAs, refer to section 340, "Internal Control," of the *OTS Examination Handbook*.

To determine and confirm appropriate coverage and inform the board, management should address insurance needs as part of the bank's risk management system that identifies risk to be retained versus risk to be transferred to another party through insurance. Refer to the "Insurance" section of this booklet and Appendix D for more information.

## Identify Risk

To properly identify risks, the board and management should recognize and understand existing risks and risks that may arise from new business initiatives, including risks that originate in nonbank subsidiaries, affiliates, and third-party relationships, and those that arise from external market forces or regulatory or statutory changes. Risk identification should be a continual process and should occur at the transaction, portfolio, and enterprise levels. For larger, more complex banks, management also should identify and report to the board on the interdependencies and correlations across portfolios and lines of business that may amplify risk exposures. Proper risk identification is critical for banks undergoing mergers and consolidations to appropriately address risks. Risk identification in merging companies begins with establishing uniform definitions of risk. A common language helps with the merger's success.

## Measure Risk

Accurate and timely measurement of risks is essential to effective risk management systems. A bank that does not have a risk measurement system has limited ability to control or monitor risk levels. Further, the bank needs more sophisticated measurement tools as the complexity of the risk increases. Management should periodically conduct tests to verify that the bank's measurement tools are accurate. Sound risk measurement systems assess the risks at the individual transaction, portfolio, and enterprise levels. During bank mergers and consolidations, the effectiveness of risk measurement tools is often impaired because of the incompatibility of the merging systems or other problems of integration. Consequently, management of the resulting company should make a concerted effort to confirm that risks are appropriately measured across the merged entity. Larger, more complex companies should assess the effect of increased transaction volumes across all risk categories.

## Monitor Risk

Management should monitor risk levels to review risk positions and exceptions to established limits in a timely manner. Monitoring reports should be timely and accurate and should be distributed to appropriate

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individuals including the board to ensure action, when needed. For larger, more complex banks, monitoring is vital to confirming that management's decisions are implemented for all geographies, products and services, and legal entities. Well-designed monitoring systems allow the board to hold management accountable for operating within established risk appetites.

## Control Risk

The board and management, in their respective roles, should establish and communicate risk limits through policies, standards, and procedures that define responsibility and authority. These limits should serve as a means to control exposures to the various risks associated with the bank's activities. The limits should be tools that management can adjust when conditions or risk appetites change. Management also should have a process to authorize and document exceptions to risk limits when warranted. In banks merging or consolidating, the transition should be tightly controlled; business plans, lines of authority, and accountability should be clear. Large, diversified banks should have strong risk controls covering all geographies, products and services, and legal entities to prevent undue concentrations of risk.

The board or audit committee should require a periodic independent assessment of the bank's overall risk governance and risk management practices, which may be conducted by internal audit. The reports should provide an overall opinion on the design and effectiveness of the bank's risk governance framework, including its system of internal controls. In smaller, less complex banks, the board should consider how internal audit reviews incorporate overall risk management.

## Risk Assessment Process

A risk assessment process should be part of a sound risk governance framework. A well-designed risk assessment process promotes the identification of emerging risks at an early stage and allows for the development and implementation of appropriate strategies to mitigate the risks before they have an adverse effect on the bank's safety and soundness or financial condition. The completed risk assessments should be integrated into the bank's strategic planning process and risk management activities.

The board should oversee management's implementation of the bank's risk assessment process. The board should periodically receive information about the bank's risk assessments.

Management should perform risk assessments on material bank activities at least annually, or more frequently as warranted. Completing risk assessments helps management identify current, emerging, and aggregate

risks and determine if actions need to be taken to strengthen risk management. Risk assessments should measure the inherent risk, which is the risk that an activity would pose if no controls or other mitigating factors were in place. A residual risk rating should be assigned after controls are taken into account. The risk assessment process should be candid and self-critical.

## Policies

Policies are statements of actions that the bank adopts to pursue certain objectives. Policies guide decisions, often set standards (on risk limits, for example), and should be consistent with the bank's underlying mission, risk appetite, and core values.

While the board or a designated board committee is responsible for approving designated policies, management is responsible for developing and implementing the policies. The CEO and management should periodically review policies for effectiveness. Policies should control the types of risks that arise from the bank's current and planned activities. To be effective, policies should clearly delineate accountability and be communicated throughout the bank.

All banks should have policies addressing their significant activities and risks. The scope and detail of those policies and procedures vary depending on bank size and complexity. A smaller, noncomplex bank whose management is heavily involved in day-to-day operations should have, at a minimum, basic policies addressing the significant areas of operations. Larger, more complex banks should have more detailed policies in which senior management relies on a widely dispersed staff to implement complex business strategies. Before introducing new activities, management should establish appropriate policies and procedures that outline the standards, responsibilities, processes, and internal controls for ensuring that risks are well understood and mitigated within reasonable parameters.

## Processes

Processes define how activities are carried out and help manage risk. Effective processes are consistent with the underlying policies and are governed by appropriate checks and balances (such as internal controls).

Management should establish processes to implement significant bank policies. The bank's size and complexity determine the amount of detail that is needed in the policies. The design of the bank's risk management processes should be tailored to the bank's operations, activities, and

## Risk Governance

business strategies and be consistent with the bank's risk appetite. Examples of bank programs include the bank's risk governance framework, audit program, CMS, and compensation program, which are discussed throughout this book. Refer to booklets of the *Comptroller's Handbook* for more information about other processes for specific areas of examination.

Management is responsible for establishing a system of internal controls<sup>86</sup> that provides for

- an organizational structure that establishes clear lines of authority and responsibility.
- monitoring adherence to established policies.
- processes governing risk limit breaches.
- an effective risk assessment process.
- timely and accurate financial, operational, and regulatory reports.
- adequate procedures to safeguard and manage assets.
- compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

## Personnel

Personnel are the bank managers and staff who execute or oversee processes. Capable management and staff are essential to effective risk management. Personnel should understand the bank's mission, risk appetite, core values, policies, and processes.

Personnel should be qualified and competent, have clearly defined responsibilities, and be held accountable for their actions. The skills and expertise of management and staff should be commensurate with the bank's products and services offered to customers. The skills required for larger, more complex banks are generally greater and more varied than those required in smaller, less diversified, and less complex banks. As the complexity and risk profile of the bank increase, the higher the need for qualified personnel with specific areas of expertise. Management should anticipate and assess the bank's needs and develop plans for maintaining staffing commensurate with the bank's risk profile.

Management should design programs to attract, develop, and retain qualified personnel. An effective recruitment program enhances the continuity of executive and middle management, and assists in the recruitment of individuals with the requisite skills and knowledge for various positions within the bank. Training and professional development programs are important for developing and maintaining a talent pool and further developing required skills and knowledge. For banks with

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<sup>86</sup> For more information on national banks, refer to the "Internal Control" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. For FSAs, refer to section 340, "Internal Control," of the *OTS Examination Handbook*.

limited staff or overlapping responsibilities, training and development are particularly important for continuous and consistent operations. Compensation programs should be designed to appropriately balance risk taking and reward. Management should continually assess the bank's recruitment, training and development, and compensation programs for the appropriate depth and breadth of staff.

Management should create and maintain an organizational structure with clear lines of responsibility, accountability, and oversight. Personnel in risk management and audit should have sufficient independence and stature. Position descriptions and a formal appraisal process reinforce responsibility and accountability for employees and managers. The appraisal review process provides important feedback about achieving performance goals. Effective communication promotes open dialogue, clear expectations and accountability, good decision making, and less duplication of effort.

## Control Systems

Control systems are the functions (such as internal and external audits, risk review, quality control, and quality assurance) and information systems that bank managers use to measure performance, make decisions about risk, and assess the effectiveness of processes and personnel. Control functions should have clear reporting lines, sufficient resources, and appropriate access and authority. MIS should provide timely, accurate, and relevant feedback.

The effectiveness of internal controls is assessed through the bank's risk reviews (often second line of defense) and audit program (third line of defense). Risk reviews may include loan review, stress testing, compliance reviews, and back testing. Management should determine the risk reviews that should be performed in the bank. Audit programs are the independent control function that verifies the effectiveness of the bank's risk management system. Unlike risk reviews, audit managers and the board should make decisions regarding the audit program to maintain appropriate independence.

### *Quality Control*

Quality control provides assurance that the bank consistently applies standards, complies with laws and regulations, and adheres to policies and procedures. An independent party performs the quality-control review concurrently with the bank activity. The quality-control review may be performed internally or outsourced to a third party. Quality control promotes an environment in which management and employees strive for the highest standards. An effective quality-control review significantly

reduces or eliminates errors before they become systemic issues or have a negative impact on the bank's operations. Management, in consultation with the board, should determine what activities require a quality-control review, for example, secondary market mortgage loan originations, retail lending, and call center. Management also should determine the method and frequency of reporting of quality-control reviews based on regulatory requirements and risk exposure to the bank.

### *Quality Assurance*

Quality assurance is designed to verify that established standards and processes are followed and consistently applied. An independent party performs the quality assurance review. The quality assurance review is normally performed after the bank completes the activity. Management uses the results of the quality assurance review to assess the quality of the bank's policies, procedures, programs, and practices in a specific area (for example, mortgage banking, retail lending, and internal audit). The results help management identify operational weaknesses, risks associated with the specific area, training needs, and process deficiencies. Management should determine which areas of the bank require a quality assurance review and should confirm that results of the reviews are reported to appropriate personnel.

### *Compliance Management System*

Banking laws and regulations cover a wide range of areas, such as corporate structure, governance, bank activities, bank assets, authorities, AML, consumer protections, and political contributions.<sup>87</sup> Therefore, CMSs should extend beyond consumer protection laws and regulations and factor in all applicable laws and regulations as well as prudent ethical standards and contractual obligations.<sup>88</sup> The board and management should recognize the scope and implications of laws and regulations that apply to the bank and its activities. The board and management should understand the potential consequences of violations of laws and regulations that could result in financial losses, litigation, and enforcement actions (including CMPs).

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<sup>87</sup> For more information on political contributions for national banks and FSAs, refer to 52 USC 30101 et seq., "Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971," and 11 CFR 114.2, "Prohibitions on Contributions, Expenditures and Electioneering Communications." For national banks, also refer to 11 CFR 100, subpart B, "Definition of Contribution," and OCC Bulletin 2007-31, "Prohibition on Political Contributions by National Banks: Updated Guidance."

<sup>88</sup> For more information regarding the aspects of the bank's CMS covering consumer protection-related laws and regulations, refer to the "Compliance Management Systems" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

The CMS should consist of the policies, procedures, and processes as well as the monitoring and testing programs that verify compliance with applicable laws and regulations and adherence to the bank's policies. All banks, regardless of size, should have a CMS that is commensurate with the risk inherent in the bank's products and services. The bank should also have monitoring in place that allows the board and management to assess the effectiveness of the bank's CMS and assists in the detection of fraud or violations of laws and regulations.

The bank's internal audit system<sup>89</sup> should include a periodic and independent review of the bank's CMS to provide the board and management reasonable assurance of the bank's consumer compliance-related risk management.

Many banks establish a separate compliance function headed by a compliance officer or committee. Compliance officers, or individuals in an equivalent role, should

- have a process to identify the laws and regulations applicable to the bank and its related organizations, maintain an inventory of such laws and regulations, and implement appropriate change management processes in response to new regulations or changes to regulations.<sup>90</sup>
- oversee the establishment of compliance monitoring and testing programs. For larger, more complex banks, this testing occurs in a second-line function that is independent of the business units.
- establish reporting processes in an effort to provide relevant information to appropriate parties.
- develop reports and metrics to monitor performance.
- implement and oversee compliance-related training programs for all employees and directors. Proper training programs reflect subject matter, depth, and frequency appropriate to job responsibilities. Escalation and reporting procedures should be in place for employees who do not complete the required training.

The board should oversee the bank's CMS. For larger, more complex banks, the board should receive periodic reports on the bank's state of compliance. The board is responsible for establishing a culture that places a high priority on compliance and holds management accountable.

<sup>89</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, II.A, "Operational and Managerial Standards," and the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook* for information regarding internal audit systems, including compliance audit systems.

<sup>90</sup> The designation of responsibility over the change management process is a senior management decision and may vary from bank to bank.

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Management should establish and clearly communicate compliance roles, responsibilities, and expectations that compliance with all laws and regulations is an organizational priority for all employees. Management is responsible for the timely correction of deficiencies found by compliance personnel, risk managers, internal and external auditors, and regulators. Management is responsible for implementing processes that promptly escalate material issues to senior management and the board. Management also should implement and maintain a mechanism for employees to confidentially raise concerns about illegal activities, violations, and nonadherence to bank policies.

*Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Program*

The BSA is intended to safeguard the U.S. financial system and the banks that make up that system from the abuses of financial crime, including money laundering, terrorist financing, and other illicit financial transactions. The BSA requires banks to establish a BSA/AML compliance program to fulfill its record-keeping and reporting requirements and to confirm the identity of bank customers.<sup>91</sup> The board is responsible for approving and overseeing management's implementation of the BSA/AML compliance program. The program must include<sup>92</sup>

- a system of internal controls to ensure ongoing compliance.
- independent testing of BSA/AML compliance.
- a designated individual or individuals responsible for managing BSA compliance (BSA compliance officer).
- training for appropriate personnel.
- a customer identification program.<sup>93</sup>

The program should also contain appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, including<sup>94</sup>

- understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile.
- conducting ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information.

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<sup>91</sup> For more information, refer to the *FFIEC BSA/AML Examination Manual*.

<sup>92</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 21.21, "Procedures for Monitoring Bank Secrecy Act Compliance."

<sup>93</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 21.21(c)(2), "Customer Identification Program."

<sup>94</sup> Refer to 31 CFR 1020.210, "Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements for Financial Institutions Regulated Only by a Federal Functional Regulator, Including Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions."

Senior management should communicate and reinforce the BSA/AML compliance culture established by the board. Senior management is also responsible for implementing and enforcing the board-approved BSA/AML compliance program.<sup>95</sup>

### *Audit Program*

Well-planned, properly structured audit programs are essential to effective risk management and internal control systems and are also a critical defense against fraud.<sup>96</sup> The audit program consists of an internal audit function and an external audit function. An internal audit program provides assurance to the board and senior management not only on the quality of the bank's internal controls but also on the effectiveness of risk management, financial reporting, MIS, and governance practices. Internal auditors should be independent of the audited activities and have sufficient stature, authority, and board support to carry out their assignments with objectivity. The external audit function complements the internal audit function by providing management and the board with an independent and objective view of the reliability of the bank's financial statements and the adequacy of its system of internal controls over the bank's financial statements. When a third party provides both audit and consulting services, special care should be taken to preserve audit independence. Specifically, the firm should not audit the activities for which it provided consultation services.<sup>97</sup> In addition, the firm should be incorporated into the bank's third-party risk management process.<sup>98</sup>

The board may delegate the design, implementation, and monitoring of the system of internal controls to management and delegate the testing and assessment of internal controls to internal auditors or other external third parties. Establishing an independent audit committee to oversee and maintain the audit functions is a good, and sometimes required, practice.<sup>99</sup> See appendix C, "Common Board Committees," of this booklet for more

<sup>95</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 21.21(c) "Establishment of a BSA Compliance Program," and 12 CFR 21.21(d)(3).

<sup>96</sup> For more information on effective audit functions, refer to the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

<sup>97</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2003-12, "Interagency Policy Statement on Internal Audit and Internal Audit Outsourcing: Revised Guidance on Internal Audit and Its Outsourcing."

<sup>98</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2013-29, "Third-Party Relationships: Risk Management Guidance"; OCC Bulletin 2017-7, "Third-Party Relationships: Supplemental Examination Procedures"; and OCC Bulletin 2020-10, "Third-Party Relationships: Frequently Asked Questions to Supplement OCC Bulletin 2013-29."

<sup>99</sup> 12 CFR 363.5(a), "Composition and Duties," requires insured banks with \$500 million or more in total assets to have a dedicated audit committee. 12 CFR 363, appendix A.27, "Composition," outlines audit committee requirements as they should be applied to banks and insured branches of foreign banks. Refer to the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook* for more information on audit committees.

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information on audit committee responsibilities. The board and senior management are responsible for having an effective system of internal controls and an effective audit system in place.<sup>100</sup>

The chief auditor is the person assigned responsibility for the internal audit function.<sup>101</sup> The chief auditor reports directly to the audit committee or the board in the absence of the audit committee. The OCC expects the chief auditor to be a bank employee, but the chief auditor may have dual reporting relationships. The objectivity of internal audit is best served when the chief auditor is functionally accountable to the audit committee but reports administratively to the CEO. The chief auditor may also be a dual employee of the holding company. The chief auditor implements the audit program and reports audit activities to the audit committee. The chief auditor should have the appropriate stature and authority in the bank to perform his or her duties, and, in certain larger banks, regulation requires the position rest one level below the CEO.<sup>102</sup> When the bank outsources the internal audit activities, the board and senior management should designate an audit liaison to coordinate audit activities.

### Heightened Standards

The audit committee reviews and approves internal audit's overall charter and audit plans. The audit committee should approve all decisions regarding the appointment or removal and annual compensation and salary adjustment of the chief audit executive. The committee may oversee the chief audit executive's administrative activities or designate them to the CEO.<sup>103</sup>

The heightened standards impose additional requirements on audit plans, as well as additional circumstances in which the internal audit should make reports to the audit committee. The audit committee should be aware of and monitor the internal audit's compliance with these heightened standards.<sup>104</sup>

<sup>100</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, II.A. Internal control systems include internal controls and information systems.

<sup>101</sup> Refer to OCC Bulletin 2003-12. In small banks that do not have a formal internal or external audit program, internal audit responsibilities may lie with an officer or employee. Refer the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook* for more information.

<sup>102</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, I.E.2, "Chief Audit Executive."

<sup>103</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, I.E.8, "Internal Audit."

<sup>104</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.C.3.

## Management Information Systems

Banks rely heavily on IT to process bank transactions, maintain critical records, and supply reports to the board and management about managing business risk.<sup>105</sup> As such, a bank's IT systems should have the capability to aggregate risks across the bank in a timely manner and under stress situations. Information provided by management in reports should be accurate, timely, and sufficiently detailed to oversee the bank's safe and sound operation.

MIS broadly refers to a comprehensive process, supported by computer-based systems, that provides the information necessary to manage the bank. To function effectively as an interactive, interrelated, and interdependent feedback system for management and staff, MIS should be useable. The five elements of a useable MIS are timeliness, accuracy, consistency, completeness, and relevance. The effectiveness of MIS is hindered whenever one or more of these elements is compromised.

**Timeliness:** To simplify prompt decision making, the bank's MIS should be capable of providing and distributing current information to appropriate users. Information systems should be designed to expedite reporting of information. The system should be able to quickly collect and edit data, summarize results, and adjust and correct errors.

**Accuracy:** A sound system of automated and manual internal controls should exist throughout all information systems processing activities. Information should receive appropriate editing, balancing, and internal control checks. The bank should employ a comprehensive internal and external audit program to validate the adequacy of internal controls.

**Consistency:** To be reliable, data should be processed and compiled consistently and uniformly. Variations in how the bank collects and reports data can distort information and trend analysis. In addition, because data collection and reporting processes change over time, management should establish sound procedures to allow for systems changes. These procedures should be well defined and documented, be clearly communicated to appropriate employees, and include an effective monitoring system.

**Completeness:** Decision makers need complete and pertinent information in summarized form. Management should capture and aggregate all of the bank's material risk exposures, including those that are off-balance-sheet. Data should be available by groupings, such as by business line, asset type, and industry, that are relevant for the risk in question. Also, the data groupings should allow for the identification and reporting on risk exposures, concentrations, and emerging risks.

<sup>105</sup> For more information, refer to the "Management" booklet of the *FFIEC IT Examination Handbook*.

**Relevance:** Information provided to management should be relevant. Information that is inappropriate, unnecessary, or too detailed for effective decision making has no value. MIS should be appropriate to support the management level using the information. The relevance and level of detail provided through MIS should directly correlate to the needs of the board, senior management, departmental or area mid-level managers, and others in the performance of their jobs.

MIS do not necessarily reduce expenses. Development of meaningful systems and their proper use lessen the probability that erroneous decisions will be made because of inaccurate or untimely information. Erroneous decisions invariably misallocate or waste resources, which may adversely affect earnings or capital.

Heightened Standards

The risk governance framework should include a set of policies, supported by appropriate procedures and processes, designed to provide risk data aggregation and reporting capabilities appropriate for the size, complexity, and risk profile of the covered bank, and to support supervisory reporting requirements. Collectively, these policies, procedures, and processes should provide for the following:

- The design, implementation, and maintenance of a data architecture and IT infrastructure that support the covered bank's risk aggregation and reporting needs during both normal times and times of stress.
- The capturing and aggregating of risk data and reporting of material risks, concentrations, and emerging risks in a timely manner to the board and the OCC.<sup>106</sup>
- The distribution of risk reports to all relevant parties at a frequency that meets their needs for decision-making purposes.<sup>107</sup>

Third-Party Risk Management

Banks increasingly rely on third-party relationships to provide technological, administrative, and operational services on the bank's behalf. The bank's use of third parties does not diminish the board and senior management's responsibility to ensure that the activity is performed in a safe and sound manner and complies with applicable laws and regulations.

<sup>106</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.J, "Risk Data Aggregation and Reporting."

<sup>107</sup> For more information, refer to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's "Principles for Effective Risk Data Aggregation and Risk Reporting," January 2013.

Management should adopt third-party risk management processes commensurate with the level of risk and complexity of the bank's third-party relationships and organizational structure.<sup>108</sup> The board and management should provide more comprehensive and rigorous oversight and management of third-party relationships that involve critical activities.

Management should adopt a third-party risk management process that follows a continuous life cycle for all relationships and incorporates planning, due diligence, and third-party selection, contract negotiation, ongoing monitoring, and termination.

## Insurance

The board should be responsible for the adequacy of insurance coverage and other insurance needs. As part of an effective risk management system, the board should determine the uninsured loss the bank is able and willing to assume. Management can implement additional controls to minimize and retain risk. Management may transfer the risk to another party through insurance or contractual transfer, self-insure the risk, or use any combination of these options. A basic tenet of risk management is that risks carrying the potential for catastrophic or significant loss should not be retained. Conversely, it typically is not cost-justified to insure losses that are relatively predictable and not severe. Teller drawer shortages are an example. It would be less costly to improve controls or training procedures intended to reduce those shortages than to pay additional insurance premiums to cover the losses.

The board should determine the maximum loss the bank is able and willing to assume. Once the decision is made to insure a particular risk, a knowledgeable, professional insurance agent can help with selecting an underwriter. Management should assess the financial capacity of the insurance underwriter to determine that the company has the ability to make payment should a significant loss occur. Additionally, the board and management should review the bank's insurance annually.

Appendix D of this booklet explains major types of insurance coverage available to banks.

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<sup>108</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletins 2013-29, 2017-7, and 2020-10, and the "Outsourcing Technology Services" booklet of the *FFIEC IT Examination Handbook*.

### *Insurance Record Keeping*

The breadth of available insurance policies and differences in the coverage emphasize the importance of maintaining a concise, easily referenced schedule of insurance coverage. These records should include the

- coverage provided, detailing major exclusions.
- underwriter.
- deductible amount.
- upper limit.
- term of the policy.
- date premiums are due.
- premium amount.

Records of losses also should be maintained and included whether or not the bank was reimbursed. These records indicate where internal controls may need to be improved and are useful in measuring the level of risk exposure in a particular area.

## **Board's Role in Risk Governance**

The board or risk committee and senior management play critical roles in the bank's risk governance by (1) setting the tone at the top, (2) setting the bank's strategic objectives and risk appetite, and (3) establishing an appropriate risk management system to manage the risks associated with meeting the strategic objectives.

Risks may arise from bank activities or activities of subsidiaries, affiliates, counterparties, or third-party relationships. Any product, service, or activity may expose the bank to multiple risks. These risks may be interdependent—an increase in one category of risk may cause an increase in others. Because of the interrelationship of the bank's risks and the potential impact on its earnings, capital, and strategic objectives, the risks should be assessed, evaluated, and managed enterprise-wide. This concept is commonly referred to as enterprise risk management. Enterprise risk management helps the board and management view the bank's risks in a comprehensive and integrated manner. Enterprise risk management also helps identify concentrations that may arise across multiple business lines that, when aggregated, represent concentration risk that may require board attention and management actions. To be successful, enterprise risk management should be supported by the board and senior management. If the bank is a subsidiary of a holding company, it may be appropriate to implement enterprise risk management corporate-wide.

The board should oversee the design and implementation of the risk governance framework and require periodic independent assessments to determine the framework's effectiveness.

The board should oversee the bank's risk management system to confirm that the system identifies, measures, monitors, and controls risks. If the bank does not have a CRE, the board should appoint a qualified individual or committee to oversee the bank's enterprise risk management process. While a qualified individual independent of day-to-day frontline management is preferred, it may not be practical for every bank. When impractical, the board should consider selecting a senior-level staff member who has a good understanding of the bank's operations across the various business lines. This person should have access to the board or risk committee to convey risk concerns.

The board should oversee the bank's compliance management programs. The board is responsible for creating a culture that places a high priority on compliance and holds management accountable.

The OCC expects the board to be responsible for confirming that a system of internal controls is in place.<sup>109</sup> The board should periodically receive information about the effectiveness of the bank's internal controls and information systems. The board should demonstrate that it has an adequate understanding of the bank's IT infrastructure, inherent risks, and existing controls.

Effective communication between the board and management is important for corporate and risk governance. The CEO and senior management play a critical role in communicating to the board and managing the bank. The board delegates authority to senior management for directing and overseeing day-to-day management of the bank. Senior management should be responsible for developing and implementing policies, procedures, and processes that translate the board's goals, strategic objectives, and risk appetite and limits into prudent standards for the safe and sound operation of the bank.

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<sup>109</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, II.A. Internal control systems include internal controls and information systems.

# Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

The OCC expects management or the board, as appropriate, to take timely corrective action when deficiencies are identified. The OCC's policy is to identify deficient practices and violations in a timely manner and initiate enforcement actions as appropriate to require corrective action well before deficiencies affect a bank's financial condition or viability.

## Enforcement Actions

The OCC uses enforcement actions to, among other purposes, require a bank's board and management to take timely actions to correct a bank's deficiencies. The OCC generally takes enforcement actions against banks and their current or former IAPs.

## Enforcement Actions Against Banks

Bank enforcement actions can be informal or formal. In determining the type of action to take, the OCC takes into consideration all relevant factors, including the condition of the bank, its long-term viability, and management and the board's willingness and capacity to address the deficiencies. The primary objective of bank enforcement actions is remediation of a bank's deficiencies. The enforcement action specifies what the bank needs to do to correct identified problems, assigns the party responsible for ensuring that corrective actions are taken, and specifies the time frames for completing those actions. This section outlines the types of enforcement actions the OCC uses to address a bank's deficiencies, including unsafe or unsound practices.<sup>110</sup> Once a bank enforcement action is in place, examiners periodically assess the bank's compliance with the enforcement action. Enforcement actions typically remain in effect until the OCC terminates the enforcement actions or replaces them with new actions.

Generally, informal enforcement actions are not public and are not enforceable in U.S. District Court. Formal enforcement actions are typically published and made available to the public and most are enforceable in U.S. District Court. In addition, violations of a formal bank enforcement action can provide the legal basis for CMP assessments.

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<sup>110</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2018-41, "OCC Enforcement Actions: OCC Enforcement Action Policies and Procedures Manuals" and its attachment, PPM 5310-3, "Bank Enforcement Actions and Related Matters."

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Tables 2 and 3 summarize the types of informal and formal enforcement actions against banks.

**Table 2:** Informal Enforcement Actions Against Banks

Type of enforcement action	Description
Commitment letter	A commitment letter is a non-public document, signed by the bank’s board on behalf of the bank, making specific written commitments to take corrective actions in response to the bank’s deficiencies. While a commitment letter is not a binding legal document, failure to honor the commitments may demonstrate the need for a formal action.
Memorandum of understanding	A memorandum of understanding is a bilateral document between the bank and the OCC. The memorandum of understanding in form and content looks very much like a formal OCC enforcement action. Like a commitment letter, a memorandum of understanding is not a binding legal document, but failure to honor the commitments may demonstrate the need for a formal action.
Individual minimum capital ratios	The OCC may establish higher capital requirements for a bank in light of its particular circumstances. <sup>111</sup> The OCC can establish these higher capital ratios through an individual minimum capital ratio. The OCC gives a bank notice and opportunity to respond to the OCC’s intent to increase the bank’s minimum capital requirement before the OCC makes a final decision. The establishment of an individual minimum capital ratio does not affect a bank’s prompt corrective action (PCA) capital category. If a bank fails to maintain its capital ratios above the higher minimums established in the individual minimum capital ratio, the OCC may issue a capital directive.

<sup>111</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1464(s)(2), “Minimum Capital Levels May Be Determined By Comptroller of the Currency Case-By-Case” (FSAs), 12 USC 3907, “Capital Adequacy,” and 12 CFR 3, subpart H, “Establishment of Minimum Capital Ratios for an Individual Bank or Individual Federal Savings Association.”

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Type of enforcement action	Description
Notice of deficiency issued under 12 CFR 30	The OCC may issue a notice of deficiency if a bank fails to comply with any established safety and soundness standards in 12 CFR 30. <sup>112</sup> The notice requires the bank to submit to the OCC a safety and soundness plan describing the steps a bank will take to correct the deficiency, including when the bank will take those steps. If the bank fails to submit an acceptable plan or fails in any material respect to implement an approved plan, the OCC must, by order, require the bank to correct the deficiencies, and the OCC may, by order, require the bank to take any other action provided in 12 USC 1831p-1(e)(2)(B).
Operating agreements	An operating agreement is a bilateral document signed by the board on behalf of a bank and an authorized OCC official. Operating agreements typically specify that they are “written agreements” within the meaning of 12 USC 1818 (that is enforceable operating agreements). Operating agreements executed by the OCC’s Licensing Division in association with or resulting from a bank’s licensing filing are not considered to be bank enforcement actions.
Certain conditions imposed in writing under 12 USC 1818	A “condition imposed in writing” within the meaning of 12 USC 1818 is imposed on a bank by the supervisory office in connection with an action on an application, notice, or other request. Conditions imposed by the OCC’s Licensing Division in association with or resulting from a bank’s licensing filing, although typically enforceable under 12 USC 1818, are generally not considered bank enforcement actions. <sup>113</sup>

<sup>112</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1831p-1 and 12 CFR 30.

<sup>113</sup> Refer to the “Conditions Imposed in Writing” section of the “Bank Supervision Process” booklet of the *Comptroller’s Handbook*.

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

**Table 3: Formal Enforcement Actions Against Banks**

Type of enforcement action	Description
Capital directive	<p>If a bank fails to achieve or maintain capital at or above the minimum ratios required by 12 CFR 3, subparts B or H; a written agreement; or a condition for approval of an applications, the OCC may issue a capital directive against the bank.<sup>114</sup> A capital directive has essentially the same force and effect as a C&amp;D order. Unlike C&amp;D orders, a failure to meet or a willful violation of a capital directive is not itself grounds for receivership.</p>
C&D order and consent order	<p>The OCC may issue a C&amp;D order when a bank engages in unsafe or unsound practices or violates a law or regulation, condition imposed in writing, or a written agreement. In addition to requiring a bank to cease and desist from an unsafe or unsound practice or violation and to take affirmative action to correct conditions resulting from the practice or violation, a C&amp;D order may require other actions or limitations, including making restitution or reimbursement.</p> <p>A C&amp;D order is imposed on an involuntary basis after the issuance of a notice of charges, a hearing, a recommended decision by an administrative law judge, and a final decision and order by the Comptroller.</p> <p>Aside from its title, a consent order is identical in form and legal effect to a C&amp;D order. A consent order, however, is issued with the consent of the bank's board.</p> <p>The OCC may enforce a C&amp;D order through application to a U.S. District Court. Violations of a C&amp;D order can provide the legal basis for additional enforcement actions, including CMPs. A willful violation of a final C&amp;D order is itself grounds for receivership.<sup>115</sup></p>
CMPs	<p>Refer to the "Civil Money Penalties" section for more information.</p>

<sup>114</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1464(s)(2) (FSAs), 12 USC 3907, and 12 CFR 3.

<sup>115</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1821(c)(5)(D).

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Type of enforcement action	Description
Formal agreement	<p>A formal agreement is a bilateral document signed by the board on behalf of a bank and an authorized OCC representative. While a formal agreement is not enforceable through the federal court system, violations of a formal agreement can provide the basis for additional enforcement actions, including CMPs.</p>
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) agreement pursuant to 12 CFR 5.39 (regarding financial subsidiaries of national banks)	<p>A GLBA agreement is an agreement between a national bank and the OCC pursuant to 12 USC 24a(e)(2) and (3) and 12 CFR 5.39(j)(1) (ii) and (iii). A national bank that controls or holds an interest in a financial subsidiary must execute a GLBA agreement with the OCC within 45 days after receiving notice that</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• the national bank or any of its depository institution affiliates are not well capitalized or well managed,</li><li>• the aggregate consolidated financial subsidiary assets exceed the limits of 12 CFR 5.39(g)(2),</li><li>• the national bank’s accounting treatment for any financial subsidiary does not comply with the standards set forth in 12 CFR 5.39(h)(1) and (2),</li><li>• the national bank’s procedures for identifying and managing financial and operational risks within the bank and the financial subsidiary do not adequately protect the bank from such risks, or</li><li>• the national bank’s policies and procedures to preserve the separate corporate identity and limited liability of the bank and the financial subsidiaries are not reasonable.</li></ul> <p>A GLBA agreement requires the national bank to comply with certain prudential requirements and may include limitations on the conduct or activities of the national bank or any subsidiary of the national bank as the OCC determines to be appropriate. If the national bank fails to correct the conditions giving rise to the notice within 180 days after receipt, the OCC may require the national bank to divest control of any financial subsidiary.</p>

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Type of enforcement action	Description
PCA	<p>If an FDIC-insured bank becomes less than adequately capitalized as defined in 12 CFR 6, in addition to restrictions automatically imposed by statute, the OCC can impose additional requirements or restrictions by issuing a PCA directive.<sup>116</sup></p> <p>Unless the OCC determines immediate action is required, the OCC notifies a bank of its intent to impose discretionary PCA restrictions and gives the bank an opportunity to respond. A PCA directive is enforceable in U.S. District Court, and failure to become adequately capitalized after a PCA directive is grounds for receivership.</p>
Restitution order	<p>A restitution order is a type of C&amp;D order, authorized under 12 USC 1818(b)(6), that can be used to require a bank to take affirmative action to correct or remedy any conditions resulting from any violation or unsafe or unsound practice, including a requirement to make restitution (or provide reimbursement, indemnification, or guarantee against loss) if the bank was unjustly enriched in connection with the violation or practice, or the violation or practice involved a reckless disregard for the law, any applicable regulations, or prior order.</p>
Safety and soundness order	<p>If a bank fails to submit or implement an acceptable safety and soundness plan under 12 CFR 30, the OCC must require the bank to correct these deficiencies through a safety and soundness order and may require the bank to take other actions under 12 USC 1831p-1(e) (2)(B) until the deficiency has been corrected. Unless immediate action is required, the OCC notifies a bank of its intent to impose a safety and soundness order and gives the bank an opportunity to respond. If the OCC decides to issue a safety and soundness order, the order is enforceable in U.S. District Court.</p>

<sup>116</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1831o, 12 CFR 6, and OCC Bulletin 2018-33, “Prompt Corrective Action: Guidelines and Rescissions.”

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Type of enforcement action	Description
Temporary C&D order	A temporary C&D order is imposed on an involuntary basis after the issuance of a notice of charges seeking a C&D order. The OCC may issue a temporary C&D order to a bank when the violation or unsafe or unsound practice described in the notice of charges, or the continuation of the violation or practice, is likely to cause the bank’s insolvency, cause significant dissipation of the bank’s assets or earnings, weaken the bank’s condition, or otherwise prejudice the interests of the bank’s depositors before the completion of the proceedings resulting from the notice of charges. A temporary C&D order may also be imposed if the notice of charges specifies a bank’s books and records are so incomplete or inaccurate that the OCC is unable, through the normal supervisory process, to determine the financial condition of the bank or the details or purpose of any transaction(s) that may have a material effect on the financial condition of the bank, or if the notice of charges specifies that any person has engaged in certain false advertising, misuse of FDIC names, or misrepresentations to indicate insured status as described in 12 USC 1828(a)(4).

Enforcement Actions Against Individuals

The OCC has the authority to undertake certain administrative actions against individual bank directors or other IAPs.<sup>117</sup>

Like bank enforcement actions, enforcement actions against individuals are formal or informal. Table 4 summarizes the types of IAP enforcement actions.

<sup>117</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2018-41 and its attachment, PPM 5310-13, “Institution-Affiliated Party Enforcement Actions and Related Matters.”

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

**Table 4:** Summary of IAP Enforcement Actions

Enforcement action	Formal or informal	Description
Supervisory letter <sup>118</sup>	Informal	A supervisory letter may be issued in any case in which the OCC wishes to communicate a concern about a supervisory problem or issue and a CMP or other IAP enforcement action against the IAP may not be warranted.
Reprimand	Informal	A reprimand is a strongly worded document used when either a personal C&D order or a CMP against an IAP is legally supportable but the OCC chooses not to pursue the action.
Personal C&D order (PC&D)	Formal	A PC&D requires an IAP to cease and desist from a violation or unsafe or unsound practice, take affirmative action to correct or remedy the conditions resulting from any such violation or practice, or adhere to limitations placed on the IAP's activities or functions. Issued pursuant to 12 USC 1818(b).
Restitution order	Formal	A restitution order, which is a type of PC&D, requires an IAP to make restitution (or provide reimbursement, indemnification, or guarantee against loss). Issued pursuant to 12 USC 1818(b)(6).
Temporary C&D order	Formal	A temporary C&D, which is effective upon service, temporarily requires an IAP to cease and desist from a violation or unsafe or unsound practice or take certain affirmative actions. The OCC may issue a temporary C&D only after filing a notice of charges seeking a PC&D. Issued pursuant to 12 USC 1818(c).
Prohibition order	Formal	A prohibition order prohibits an IAP from participation, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution. Issued pursuant to 12 USC 1818(e).

<sup>118</sup> As used here, "supervisory letter" refers solely to a supervisory letter sent to an IAP or other individual or entity (not a bank).

Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Enforcement action	Formal or informal	Description
Suspension order	Formal	A suspension order, which is effective upon service, temporarily suspends the IAP from office or prohibits the IAP from participation in the affairs of the bank. The OCC may issue a suspension order only after filing a notice of charges for a prohibition order. Issued pursuant to 12 USC 1818(e).
Prohibition/ suspension order for criminal conduct	Formal	A prohibition or suspension order for criminal conduct temporarily suspends an IAP indicted for certain crimes from office or prohibits the IAP from participation, in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution. If the IAP is ultimately convicted of the crime, the OCC issues either a permanent prohibition order or an 1829 prohibition notification. Issued pursuant to 12 USC 1818(g).
CMP	Formal	Refer to the “Civil Money Penalties” section of this booklet for more information.

Additionally, under 12 USC 1829, “Penalty for Unauthorized Participation by Convicted Individual,” individuals who are convicted of or enter into a pretrial diversion program<sup>119</sup> for a crime involving dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering are automatically barred from being an IAP with respect to any insured depository institution or from directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or otherwise participating in the affairs of any insured depository institution. Upon receipt of relevant judgment and conviction documents from a state or federal court involving a current or former IAP at an OCC-supervised insured depository institution, the OCC issues a letter informing the IAP of the automatic prohibition. Although not technically an OCC enforcement action, the fact that an 1829 prohibition notification has been sent to an IAP is made public on the OCC’s website. An individual, under certain circumstances, may apply to the FDIC for a termination of this automatic prohibition. An individual who knowingly violates the prohibition is subject to civil and criminal enforcement actions.

<sup>119</sup> Under a typical federal pretrial diversion program, an offender enters into a program of supervised probation and, upon successful completion, the U.S. Attorney will decline prosecution and the charges will be dismissed. Similar programs at the state level have various names, including deferred prosecution agreements, but are considered a pretrial diversion program covered by this statute.

## Civil Money Penalties

The OCC has the authority to assess a CMP<sup>120</sup> against a bank, current or former directors or other IAPs, bank service companies, and service providers.<sup>121</sup>

When determining the amount of the CMP assessment, the OCC considers the following statutory factors:

- The size of the financial resources and good faith of the institution or IAP charged
- The gravity of the violation
- The history of previous violations
- Other matters as justice may require

The federal banking agencies have adopted the FFIEC “Interagency Policy Regarding the Assessment of Civil Money Penalties by the Federal Financial Institutions Regulatory Agencies” (1998 FFIEC Interagency Policy), which sets forth 13 relevant factors that the agencies consider in assessing CMPs, consistent with the four statutory factors.<sup>122</sup>

The OCC determines the amount of a CMP on a case-by-case basis after consideration of any applicable statutory maximums, CMP matrices, statutory and interagency factors, and any other relevant considerations. The maximum amount is based on the type of CMP assessed and is adjusted annually for inflation.<sup>123</sup>

Banks or IAPs have the opportunity to submit written information about the alleged misconduct, the specific factors the OCC considers when determining whether to assess a CMP, and other information believed to be relevant to the OCC’s enforcement decisions before the commencement of any administrative enforcement. After the OCC makes a decision in an IAP CMP matter, the OCC will, as applicable, issue the individual a no-action letter, a supervisory letter, a reprimand, or a proposed consent order. If a bank or an IAP does not consent to the issuance of the authorized CMP, the OCC will file a notice of assessment, which formally commences the administrative

<sup>120</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2018-41 and its attachment, PPM 5000-7, “Civil Money Penalties.”

<sup>121</sup> The OCC’s general CMP authority is set forth in 12 USC 1818(i). In addition to the OCC’s general statutory CMP authority in 12 USC 1818(i), the OCC has separate statutory authority to assess CMPs for violations of certain specific laws and regulations, including change of control regulations, call report filing requirements, and flood insurance laws and regulations.

<sup>122</sup> The OCC transmitted the 1998 FFIEC Interagency Policy in OCC Bulletin 1998-32, “Civil Money Penalties: Interagency Statement.”

<sup>123</sup> Refer to OCC Bulletin 2020-2, “Civil Money Penalties: Notice Adjusting Maximum Civil Money Penalties for 2020” for the relevant laws and associated maximum penalties applicable in 2020.

## Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

hearing process (litigation). Supervisory letters and letters of reprimand state that no assessment will be imposed but advise that future unsafe or unsound practices, or breaches of fiduciary duty, or violations of laws, regulations, rules, or outstanding final orders and agreements may result in OCC action.

## Other Actions Against Banks or Individuals

The OCC may pursue actions to enforce federal securities laws as they apply to banks or individuals who are subject to the jurisdiction of the OCC. The OCC may bring actions for violations of the Securities Exchange Act registration, reporting, and disclosure provisions, and provisions governing (i) bank municipal securities dealers, (ii) bank government securities brokers and dealers, and (iii) bank transfer agents, and (iv) other applicable provisions of the Exchange Act.<sup>124</sup> Actions also may be based on violations of the OCC's securities offering disclosure rules, 12 CFR 16, and other laws and regulations governing the securities activities of banks. The OCC has authority under the Securities Exchange Act to serve a disciplinary order that may<sup>125</sup>

- censure, limit the activities, functions or operations, or suspend or revoke the registration of a bank which is a municipal securities dealer;
- censure, suspend or bar any person associated or seeking to become associated with a municipal securities dealer;
- censure, limit the activities, functions or operations, or suspend or bar a bank which is a government securities broker or dealer;
- censure, limit the activities, functions or operations, or suspend or bar any person associated with a government securities broker or dealer;
- deny registration to, limit the activities, functions, or operations or suspend or revoke the registration of a bank which is a transfer agent; or
- censure or limit the activities or functions, or suspend or bar, any person associated or seeking to become associated with a transfer agent.

The OCC may use these actions alone or in combination with other enforcement actions.

FDIC-insured banks are subject to certain restrictions and actions depending on the bank's PCA capital category. These can include a PCA dismissal, which is the dismissal of a director or senior executive officer from office. A PCA dismissal is a PCA action against a bank, but the dismissed director or senior executive officer has certain procedural rights.

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<sup>124</sup> For more information, refer to 15 USC 78a et seq., "Securities Exchange Act of 1934."

<sup>125</sup> Refer to 12 CFR 19.132, "Disciplinary Orders."

## Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

The OCC can remove, suspend, or bar an independent public accountant, potentially including his or her accounting firm, upon a showing of good cause, from performing audit services required by 12 USC 1831m.

Additionally, the condition of the bank may affect individuals in other ways. For example, banks that are in “troubled condition,” as defined in 12 CFR 5.51, must provide written notice to the OCC before adding or replacing directors or senior executive officers (i.e., the “914 process”) and are subject to golden parachute restrictions under 12 CFR 359. Refer to the “Changes in Directors and Senior Executive Officers” booklet of the *Comptroller’s Licensing Manual* for more information about the 914 process. Finally, through the issuance of an enforcement action against the bank, the OCC has the authority under 12 USC 1818(b)(6) to require the bank to take affirmative action to correct or remedy any conditions resulting from a violation or an unsafe or unsound practice.

## Supervision of Problem Banks

The OCC defines problem banks as those with composite CAMELS ratings of 3, 4, or 5. Examples of deficiencies that commonly exist in problem banks include the following:

- Weak board or management oversight.
- Ineffective, dominant, or dishonest management.
- Vacancies in critical management positions.
- Failure of the board or senior management to understand and manage the bank’s risks.
- Inadequate policies, processes, or control systems.
- Internal control weaknesses.
- Insider abuse or fraud.
- Lack of a viable strategic plan.
- Uncontrolled, rapid, or significant growth.
- Excessive amount of low-quality assets.
- Excessive concentrations of credit, investments, or wholesale funding sources.
- Insufficient capital.
- Deferred loan loss provisions, charge-offs, or recognition of securities impairment.
- Strained liquidity, including reliance on wholesale funding sources.
- Significant interest rate risk exposure.

A problem bank becomes subject to enhanced statutory or regulatory restrictions as its condition declines, particularly when its PCA capital category declines. The board is responsible for overseeing the bank’s compliance with these restrictions.

## Enforcement Actions and Supervision of Problem Banks

Typically, the local field office retains primary oversight responsibility over 3-rated problem community banks. If the OCC believes the severity of the weakness may significantly affect the bank's viability or requires specialized expertise to supervise the bank's rehabilitation or resolution, supervision may be assigned to the OCC's Special Supervision program in Washington, D.C. In either case, the board should expect additional OCC oversight of the bank. The Special Supervision team collaborates with the local field office in determining the supervisory activities and strategy for the bank. For all problem banks, the OCC requires necessary corrective action to return the bank to a safe and sound condition.

## Conservatorship and Receivership

The OCC has the authority to place an FDIC-insured bank into conservatorship or receivership when the bank is insolvent or has tangible equity capital of 2 percent or less. Under certain circumstances, the OCC may initiate resolution by placing a bank into receivership or conservatorship, or requiring its sale, merger, or liquidation before the bank becomes insolvent or has tangible equity capital of 2 percent or less.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1821(c)(5), "Grounds for Appointing Conservator or Receiver." Refer also to OCC Bulletin 2018-14 and its attachment, PPM 5310-3.

# Appendixes

## Appendix A: Board of Directors Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

National banks and FSAs are subject to certain statutory and regulatory requirements governing size, composition, and other aspects of the board and the directors.<sup>127</sup> The following table highlights these requirements but does not intend to be all-inclusive, nor is it meant to be an authoritative restatement of the regulations. The regulations are subject to updates and revisions.

**Table 5:** Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

National banks	FSAs
Citizenship	
All national bank directors must be U.S. citizens. The OCC may waive the citizenship requirement for a minority of the total number of directors. <sup>128</sup>  CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.	No similar statutory or regulatory requirement.
Residency	
A majority of directors must reside in the state where the national bank is located (i.e., the state where the national bank has its main office or branches) or within 100 miles of the bank's main office for at least one year immediately preceding the election and must be a resident of the state or within 100 miles of the state. <sup>129</sup>	No similar statutory or regulatory requirement.

<sup>127</sup> For more information on statutory and regulatory requirements for CSAs, refer to OCC Bulletin 2019-25 and OCC Bulletin 2019-31. Covered savings associations are generally subject to provisions of law applicable to national banks, except as otherwise provided in 12 CFR 101.4. Refer also to the OCC's *Key Differences Among National Bank, Federal Savings Association, and Covered Savings Association Requirements*.

<sup>128</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 72, "Qualifications."

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

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National banks	FSAs
<b>Conflicts of interest</b>	
<p>Although national bank directors and officers are not subject to a regulation regarding conflicts of interest, they have a fiduciary responsibility to the national bank.</p> <p>In addition, the common law duty of loyalty requires directors and management to act in the best interest of the national bank and to ensure insiders do not abuse their position by benefiting personally at the national bank’s expense.</p> <p>CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.</p>	<p>Directors, officers, or persons having the power to direct an FSA’s management or policies or who otherwise owe a fiduciary duty to an FSA are prohibited from advancing their own personal or business interests at the expense of the FSA. Also, he or she must follow certain requirements when he or she has an interest in a matter before the board.<sup>130</sup></p>
<b>Usurpation of corporate opportunity</b>	
<p>Although national bank directors and officers are not subject to a regulation regarding usurpation of corporate opportunity, they owe a common law fiduciary duty of loyalty to the bank.</p> <p>The usurpation of corporate opportunity doctrine, a part of the duty of loyalty, prevents insiders from improperly taking business opportunities away from the bank.</p> <p>CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.</p>	<p>Directors, officers, or persons having the power to direct an FSA’s management or policies or who otherwise owe a fiduciary duty to an FSA must not take advantage of corporate opportunities belonging to the FSA. The OCC will not deem a person to have taken advantage of a corporate opportunity belonging to the FSA if a disinterested and independent majority of the board, after receiving a full and fair presentation of the matter, rejected the opportunity as a matter of sound business judgment.<sup>131</sup></p>
<b>Attorney</b>	
<p>No similar prohibition. CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.</p>	<p>Not more than one director may be an attorney with a particular law firm.<sup>132</sup></p>

<sup>130</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.200, “Conflicts of Interest.”

<sup>131</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.201, “Corporate Opportunity.”

<sup>132</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.33, “Directors, Officers, and Employees.”

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National banks	FSAs
<b>Stock interest</b>	
A national bank director must own a qualifying equity interest in a national bank or a company that has control of the national bank. A minimum qualifying equity interest is common or preferred stock that has not less than an aggregate par value of \$1,000, an aggregate shareholder's equity of \$1,000, or an aggregate fair market value of \$1,000. <sup>133</sup> CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.	<p>A director of a stock FSA need not be a stockholder of the FSA unless the bylaws so require.<sup>134</sup></p> <p>A director of a mutual FSA is required to be a member of the FSA.<sup>135</sup></p>
<b>President as director</b>	
The president (but not the CEO) of the national bank is required to be a member of the board. The board may elect a director other than the president to be chair of the board. <sup>136</sup> CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.	No similar statutory or regulatory requirement. Certain FSAs have bylaws, however, that require the president or CEO to be a member of the board.
<b>Number of directors</b>	
The number of directors of each national bank is authorized by the bylaws and limited to not less than five or more than 25, unless the OCC exempts the national bank from the 25 limit. The OCC may appoint a receiver for a national bank with fewer than five directors. <sup>137</sup> CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.	The number of directors of each FSA, including CSAs, is authorized by the bylaws and limited to not fewer than five or more than 15, unless otherwise approved by the OCC. <sup>138</sup>

<sup>133</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 72, and 12 CFR 7.2005, “Ownership Necessary to Qualify As Director.”

<sup>134</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 5.22(l)(1), “General Powers and Duties.”

<sup>135</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 5.21(j)(2)(viii), “Number of Directors, Membership.”

<sup>136</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 76, “President of Bank as Member of Board; Chairman of Board,” and 12 CFR 7.2012, “President as Director; Chief Executive Officer.”

<sup>137</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 71a, “Number of Directors; Penalties”; 12 USC 191, “Appointment of Receiver for a National Bank”; and 12 CFR 7.2024, “Staggered Terms for National Bank Directors and Size of Bank Board.”

<sup>138</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 5.22(l)(2), “Number and Term,” for stock associations and 12 CFR 5.21(j)(2)(viii) for mutual associations.

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National banks	FSAs
Family	
No similar prohibition.	Not more than two of the directors may be members of the same immediate family. <sup>139</sup> CSAs are treated as FSAs for this rule.
Officers or employees	
No similar statutory or regulatory requirement.	A majority of the directors must not be salaried officers or employees of the FSA or any subsidiary. <sup>140</sup>
Term limits	
Any national bank director may hold office for a term that does not exceed three years and until his or her successor is elected and qualified. Any national bank may adopt bylaws that provide for staggering the terms of its directors. National banks shall provide the OCC with copies of any bylaws so amended. <sup>141</sup> CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.	Directors shall be elected for a term of one to three years and until their successors are elected and qualified. If a staggered board is chosen, the directors shall be divided into two or three classes as nearly equal in number as possible, and one class shall be elected by ballot annually. <sup>142</sup>
Committee member requirements	
Refer to the “Establish and Maintain an Appropriate Board Structure” section and appendix C of this booklet.	Refer to the “Establish and Maintain an Appropriate Board Structure” section and appendix C of this booklet.

<sup>139</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.33, “Directors, Officers, and Employees.”

<sup>140</sup> Ibid.

<sup>141</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 71, “Election,” and 12 CFR 7.2024, “Staggered Terms For National Bank Directors and Size of Bank Board.”

<sup>142</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 5.22(l)(2) for stock associations and 12 CFR 5.21(j)(2)(viii) for mutual associations.

## Appendix B: Regulations Requiring Board Approval for Policies and Programs

The board must approve and oversee management’s implementation of written policies and certain programs and practices. Table 6 is not intended to be all-inclusive, nor is it meant to be an authoritative restatement of the regulations. The regulations are subject to updates and revisions.

**Table 6:** Regulatory Requirements

Policy	National banks and FSAs	National banks only	FSAs only
BSA compliance program	The board must approve the BSA compliance program, which establishes and maintains procedures reasonably designed to assure and monitor compliance with BSA requirements. <sup>143</sup>		
Compensation and employment contracts of officers, directors, and employees	Refer to the “Safe and sound banking practices” row later in this table. Also refer to the “Incentive Compensation” section of this booklet.	Officers serve at will. <sup>144</sup>	

<sup>143</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 21.21.

<sup>144</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 24(Fifth), “Corporate Powers of Association.”

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Policy	National banks and FSAs	National banks only	FSAs only
Fiduciary compensation and powers		<p>A national bank may not permit any officer or employee to retain any compensation for acting as co-fiduciary with the bank in the administration of a fiduciary account, except with the specific approval of the board.<sup>145</sup></p> <p>A national bank’s asset management activities shall be managed by or under the direction of its board.<sup>146</sup></p> <p>A national bank exercising fiduciary powers shall adopt and follow written policies and procedures adequate to maintain its fiduciary activities in compliance with applicable law.<sup>147</sup></p>	<p>An FSA must adopt and follow written policies and procedures adequate to maintain its fiduciary activities in compliance with applicable law.<sup>148</sup></p> <p>The exercise of fiduciary powers must be managed by or under the direction of the board.<sup>149</sup></p>
Financial derivatives		No equivalent regulation.	The board is responsible for effective oversight of financial derivative activities and must establish written policies and procedures governing such activities. <sup>150</sup> This rule also applies to CSAs.

<sup>145</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 9.15(b), “Compensation of Co-Fiduciary Officers and Employees.” For more information, refer to 12 CFR 9.15(b), “Compensation of Co-Fiduciary Officers and Employees.”

<sup>146</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 9.4, “Administration of Fiduciary Powers.”

<sup>147</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 9.5, “Policies and Procedures.”

<sup>148</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 150.140, “Must I Adopt and Follow Written Policies and Procedures in Exercising Fiduciary Powers?”

<sup>149</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 150.150, “Who Is Responsible for the Exercise of Fiduciary Powers?”

<sup>150</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.172, “Financial Derivatives.”

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Policy	National banks and FSAs	National banks only	FSAs only
Heightened standards	Banks with average total consolidated assets of \$50 billion or greater or those that are OCC-designated, which are referred to as covered banks, should have robust governance as outlined in the guidelines. <sup>151</sup>		
Identity theft prevention program	The board must approve the initial, written identity theft prevention program that establishes and maintains policies and procedures reasonably designed to monitor, detect, and mitigate identity theft. <sup>152</sup>		
Information security standards	The board or an appropriate committee of the board shall approve a written information security program and oversee the program's development, implementation, and maintenance. <sup>153</sup>		

<sup>151</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D.

<sup>152</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 41.90(d), “Establishment of an Identity Theft Prevention Program”; 12 CFR 41.90(e), “Administration of the Program”; and 12 CFR 41, appendix J, “Interagency Guidelines on Identity Theft Detection, Prevention, and Mitigation.”

<sup>153</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30.

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Policy	National banks and FSAs	National banks only	FSAs only
Interbank liabilities	The board must review and approve written policies and procedures to prevent excessive exposure to any individual correspondent in relation to the condition of the correspondent. <sup>154</sup>		
Interest rate risk management	A bank should provide for periodic reporting to management and the board regarding interest rate risk with adequate information for management and the board to assess the level of risk. <sup>155</sup>		The board must review the association's interest rate risk exposure and devise and adopt policies for the management of interest rate risk. The board must review the results of operations at least quarterly and make appropriate adjustments as necessary. <sup>156</sup> This does not apply to CSAs.

<sup>154</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 206, “Limitations on Interbank Liabilities (Regulation F).”

<sup>155</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix A, II.E, “Interest Rate Exposure.”

<sup>156</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.176, “Interest-Rate-Risk-Management Procedures.”

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Policy	National banks and FSAs	National banks only	FSAs only
Real estate lending standards, interagency, and supplemental lending limits	A bank eligible to participate in the supplemental lending limits program for residential real estate and small business loans must submit an application to, and receive approval from, its supervisory office before using the supplemental lending limits in 12 CFR 32.7(a)(1), (2), and (3). <sup>157</sup>	The board must, at least annually, review and approve written policies that establish appropriate limits and standards for extensions of credit that are secured by real estate. <sup>158</sup>	The board must, at least annually, review and approve written policies that establish appropriate limits and standards for extensions of credit that are secured by real estate. <sup>159</sup>
Report of condition and income		The bank's president, a vice president, the cashier, or any other officer designated by the board must sign the report, and three directors must attest to the report's correctness. <sup>160</sup> CSAs are not treated as national banks for these provisions.	Two directors must attest to the report's correctness. <sup>161</sup>
Safe and sound banking practices	The board must oversee the bank's compliance with safe and sound banking practices. <sup>162</sup>		

<sup>157</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 32.7(b), "Application Process."

<sup>158</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 34, subpart D, "Real Estate Lending Standards," and subpart D, appendix A, "Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending."

<sup>159</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 160.101, "Real Estate Lending Standards."

<sup>160</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 161, "Reports to Comptroller of the Currency," and 12 USC 1817(a)(3), "Reports of Condition; Access to Reports."

<sup>161</sup> For more information, refer to 12 USC 1464(v), "Reports of Condition," and 12 USC 1817(a)(3).

<sup>162</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, "Safety and Soundness Standards."

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Policy	National banks and FSAs	National banks only	FSAs only
Security program and designation of a security officer	The board must approve and oversee the adoption, implementation, and maintenance of a written security program for the main and branch offices. <sup>163</sup> The board must designate a security officer to report at least annually on the implementation, administration, and effectiveness of the security program. <sup>164</sup>		
Specific funds availability	To meet the requirements of a specific availability policy disclosure under 12 CFR 229.17 and CFR 229.18(d), a bank shall provide a disclosure describing the bank’s policy on when funds deposited in an account are available for withdrawal. <sup>165</sup>		

<sup>163</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, Appendix B, III.A., “Development and Implementation of Information Security Program.”

<sup>164</sup> For national banks, refer to 12 CFR 21, subpart A, “Minimum Security Devices and Procedures.” For FSAs, including CSAs, refer to 12 CFR 168, “Security Procedures.”

<sup>165</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 229.16, “Specific Availability Policy Disclosure,” and 12 CFR 229, appendix C, “Model Availability Policy Disclosures, Clauses, and Notices; Model Substitute Check Policy Disclosure and Notices.”

## Appendix C: Common Board Committees

This list provides examples of common board committees. Some committees are mandated by laws or regulations.

**Table 7:** Common Board Committees

Committee	Description
Executive committee	<p>Some boards choose to use an executive committee. The executive committee generally</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• addresses matters requiring board review that arise between full board meetings.</li><li>• relieves the full board of detailed reviews of information and operational activities.</li><li>• coordinates the work of other board committees.</li></ul> <p>When used, the board traditionally authorizes the executive committee to act on the board's behalf but limits the authority to exercise all of the board's powers. For example, the full board should reserve the right to execute extraordinary contracts, such as mergers and acquisitions. The full board should review the executive committee charter and verify that the charter clearly specifies the committee's authority and what the committee may approve on the board's behalf.</p> <p>The use of an executive committee should not lead to a two-tiered class of directors in which the executive committee wields all the power. All directors share the same responsibilities and liabilities. Additionally, the executive committee should not be confused with executive sessions of the independent directors of the board.</p>

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Committee	Description
Audit committee	<p>The audit committee should oversee the bank's audit program and ensure that it is sufficiently robust to identify, test, and report on all key activities in the bank. Establishing an independent audit committee to oversee and maintain the audit functions is a good, and sometimes required, practice. The bank's size and activities dictate the composition of the audit committee.</p> <p>The audit committee's responsibilities should include the following:<sup>166</sup></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Work with internal and external auditors to confirm that the bank has comprehensive audit coverage to meet the risks and demands posed by its current and planned activities.</li> <li>• Hold senior management accountable for establishing and maintaining an adequate and effective internal control system and processes.</li> <li>• Carry out the appointment and termination, setting of compensation, and oversight of the chief auditor or equivalent and the independent public accountant or external auditor.</li> <li>• Ensure external auditors are independent and objective in their findings and consistent with their independence principles and rules.</li> <li>• Monitor the financial reporting process and oversee the bank's establishment of accounting policies and practices.</li> <li>• Establish and maintain whistle-blower procedures for bank employees to submit confidential and anonymous concerns for accounting, controls, or auditing matters.</li> <li>• Monitor, track, and hold management accountable for effectively addressing in a timely manner, deficiencies that auditors or regulators identify.</li> </ul>
Credit committee	<p>The credit committee oversees the bank's credit risk and its associated risk management practices. The credit committee should</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establish and guide the bank's lending strategy, credit risk appetite, and risk limits.</li> <li>• review and approve lending policies and underwriting standards that reflect the bank's risk appetite.</li> <li>• approve loans as outlined in the bank's lending policy for credits involving large dollar amounts relative to the bank's size and capital levels.</li> <li>• monitor the loan portfolio's performance, exceptions, and the allowance for loan and lease losses.</li> <li>• oversee the bank's compliance with credit-related policies, limits, laws, and regulations.</li> <li>• receive periodic reports from the loan review function that opine on the effectiveness of the bank's loan rating systems and credit risk management practices.</li> </ul>

<sup>166</sup> For more information on audit committee requirements and responsibilities, refer to the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

Committee	Description
Asset-liability committee	<p>In most banks, the board delegates responsibility for overseeing liquidity and interest rate risk and its associated risk management to a committee of senior managers. If there is a board-level asset-liability committee, the committee should</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• establish and guide the bank's asset-liability strategies, rate risk appetites, and limits.</li><li>• review liquidity and interest rate risk reports and understand key assumptions.</li><li>• monitor the bank's performance and overall liquidity position and interest rate risk profile and compliance with policies, strategies, limits, and regulations.</li><li>• verify that asset-liability strategies remain prudent and supported by adequate capital and liquidity levels.</li><li>• identify senior managers who have authority and responsibility for managing these risks and verify that adequate resources are devoted to asset-liability management.</li></ul> <p>Regulations require FSA boards to monitor financial derivatives activities and interest rate risk. FSA boards must adopt appropriate policies and procedures and periodically review them.<sup>167</sup> These regulations also apply to CSAs. While the regulations do not apply to national banks, the guidelines contain sound practices that all banks should follow.</p>

<sup>167</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 163.172 and 12 CFR 163.176.

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Committee	Description
Risk committee	<p>The risk committee's primary responsibility is risk oversight. While not required, banks that have increased complexity customarily establish a separate risk committee. For smaller banks, the audit committee sometimes assumes the oversight of risk management activities. Although it is not required, larger banks often have a risk committee. The risk committee should include independent directors who review and approve a sound risk management system commensurate with the bank's size, complexity, and risk profile.</p> <p>The risk committee's roles and responsibilities should be explicitly defined and may include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• helping to define the bank's risk appetite.</li><li>• working with the board and management to confirm that the bank's strategic, liquidity, and capital plans are consistent with the bank's risk appetite statement and that material risks are addressed in the bank's risk management process.</li><li>• reviewing and approving risk limits.</li><li>• confirming the bank has appropriate policies and procedures for risk governance, risk management practices, and the risk control infrastructure.</li><li>• working with management to establish processes for identifying and reporting risks.</li><li>• addressing the bank's material risks in aggregate and by risk type.</li><li>• addressing the effect of the risks to capital, earnings, and liquidity under normal and stressed conditions.</li><li>• confirming the independence of the risk management functions.</li><li>• overseeing and directing the work of the CRE or equivalents.</li><li>• confirming effective and timely escalation of material issues to the board and holding management accountable for timely and appropriate corrective action.</li></ul>
	<p><b>Heightened Standards</b></p> <p>The board or its risk committee should approve the risk governance framework and any significant changes.<sup>168</sup> The board or its risk committee also should monitor compliance with the risk governance framework.<sup>169</sup> Each CRE should have unrestricted access to the board risk committee regarding risk and issues identified through IRM activities.<sup>170</sup> The board or its risk committee approves the appointment and removal of a CRE and the CRE's annual compensation and salary adjustment.<sup>171</sup></p>

<sup>168</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, II.A.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 30, appendix D, I.E.7, “Independent Risk Management.”

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

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Committee	Description
Fiduciary committee	<p>A bank with fiduciary (trust) powers must comply with a host of state and federal laws and regulations governing fiduciary activities in addition to trust accounts' governing instruments.<sup>172</sup> The board typically establishes three fiduciary committees to oversee fiduciary activities and asset management products and services, including fiduciary compliance: one for administrative decisions, one relating to investment oversight, and a fiduciary audit committee.<sup>173</sup> Smaller, less complex banks may have a variation of these committees, such as a trust committee and a fiduciary audit committee.</p> <p>A bank with fiduciary powers must have an audit of fiduciary activities as well as a fiduciary audit committee.<sup>174</sup> Regulations outline the composition requirements of the fiduciary audit committee. The committee oversees the bank's audit of significant fiduciary activities. The audit could be conducted annually or continuously, depending on the audit's setup. The committee should note results of the audit and actions taken in the minutes of the board or the fiduciary audit committee.</p>

<sup>172</sup> For more information, refer to the "Asset Management" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*. For more information on a national bank and CSA's fiduciary responsibilities refer to 12 CFR 9, "Fiduciary Activities of National Banks,". For information on FSAs refer to 12 CFR 150, "Fiduciary Powers of Federal Savings Associations."

<sup>173</sup> For more information on audits of fiduciary activities, refer to the "Internal and External Audits" booklet of the *Comptroller's Handbook*.

<sup>174</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 9.9, "Audit of Fiduciary Activities" (national banks), and 12 CFR 150.440-480, "Audit Requirements" (FSAs).

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Committee	Description
Compensation committee	<p>A bank may have a compensation committee to oversee compensation arrangements. The compensation committee typically</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• oversees the design and implementation of any incentive compensation arrangements for covered employees as discussed in the “Oversee Compensation and Benefits Arrangements” section of this booklet.</li><li>• reviews and recommends compensation for directors, including the board and board committee fee structure.</li><li>• works closely with board-level risk and audit committees to confirm that all committee decisions align with the bank’s strategic objectives and risk appetite, and appropriately balance risk and reward.</li><li>• has an understanding of all the bank’s compensation and benefits arrangements, including the relationship between the arrangements and the risks or behaviors that the arrangements may incentivize; whether the arrangements are designed to promote long-term shareholder value and not promote excessive risk taking; and the legal requirements governing such arrangements.</li><li>• provides periodic reports to the full board on compensation and benefits matters.</li></ul> <p>The compensation committee may assume other responsibilities, such as overseeing the bank’s employee benefits plans. If the committee oversees these activities, it should confirm the bank has a process to appropriately administer benefits and meet the bank’s fiduciary responsibilities.</p> <p>The compensation committee may engage consultants for compensation studies and assistance with developing incentive compensation arrangements. In addition, the compensation committee may be responsible for monitoring administrative costs paid to third-party professionals. If the bank has an employee benefit plan, the committee should also determine that no more than reasonable compensation is paid to the third party out of employee benefit plan assets.</p>

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Committee	Description
Corporate governance/nominating committee	<p>At many banks, the corporate governance/nominating committee duties involve</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• establishing criteria for board and committee membership, including qualifications and independence requirements.</li> <li>• recommending nominees for election to the board, evaluating new nominees, and assessing the contributions of current directors in connection with their re-nomination.</li> <li>• reviewing and approving a management succession policy and plan for senior management positions.</li> <li>• overseeing the bank's corporate governance practices with regard to board composition and independence.</li> <li>• verifying that the board reflects a mix of talent, expertise, and perspectives that is appropriate to the bank's needs, its strategic plans, and the overall effectiveness of the board.</li> </ul> <p>A mutual FSA must have a nominating committee if the association's bylaws provide for submission of nominations for directors before the annual meeting. This committee submits nominations to the secretary of the association.<sup>175</sup></p> <p>Other responsibilities of the corporate governance/nominating committee can include</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• overseeing the evaluation of board performance and individual director contributions.</li> <li>• conducting an evaluation of its own performance.</li> <li>• assisting other board committees with their self-assessments.</li> <li>• periodically assessing board size and composition.</li> <li>• establishing director tenure policies that address procedures for the retirement or replacement of directors.</li> <li>• assessing the reporting channels and mechanisms through which the board receives information and the quality and timeliness of the information.</li> <li>• overseeing director education and training.</li> <li>• establishing and overseeing procedures for shareholder communications, including the solicitation of shareholder recommendations for the nomination of directors to the board.</li> </ul> <p>If the bank does not have a compensation committee to review and recommend changes to the bank's director compensation policies, the corporate governance/nominating committee should perform these duties.</p>

<sup>175</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 5.21(j)(2)(xiii), "Nominations for Directors."

## Appendix D: Common Types of Insurance

This appendix explains some of the common types of insurance policies and coverage available to banks. The names of the insurance policies or coverage may differ among banks or providers.

### Indemnification Agreements

A bank director may be named as a defendant in lawsuits that challenge his or her business decisions or activities or allege a breach of fiduciary duty. Directors and officers, however, may obtain some protection against judgments and legal and other costs through indemnification agreements and insurance.

Banks may enter into indemnification agreements with directors. Such agreements generally provide that the bank will advance funds to, or reimburse directors for, reasonable expenses incurred in defense of legal actions. The agreement must be consistent with applicable laws and regulations and should be consistent with safe and sound banking practices.

Regulations limit indemnification agreements.<sup>176</sup> Banks generally may not make or agree to make indemnification payments to an IAP (e.g., directors, officers, employees, or controlling stockholders)<sup>177</sup> for liability or legal expenses resulting from administrative proceedings or civil actions instituted by any federal banking agency that results in a final order or settlement pursuant to which an IAP is

- assessed a CMP.
- removed from office or prohibited from service.
- required to cease and desist or take any described affirmative action with the bank.<sup>178</sup>

Reasonable indemnification payments with respect to an administrative proceeding or civil action initiated by any federal banking agency are permitted subject to the board making specific determinations and following specific procedures.<sup>179</sup> Reasonable indemnification payments are also permitted in other situations.<sup>180</sup> FSAs—but not national banks—are required to obtain OCC non-objection before making any indemnification payments.

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<sup>176</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 359.

<sup>177</sup> Refer to 12 USC 1813(u), "Institution-Affiliated Party," for the full definition.

<sup>178</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 359.1(l), "Prohibited Indemnification Payment," and 12 CFR 359.3, "Prohibited Indemnification Payments."

<sup>179</sup> For more information, refer to 12 CFR 359.5, "Permissible Indemnification Payments."

<sup>180</sup> For national banks, refer to 12 CFR 7.2014, "Indemnification of Institution-Affiliated Parties." For more information regarding FSAs, including CSAs, refer to 12 CFR 145.121, "Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Employees."

## Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance

Director and officer (D&O) liability insurance protects directors and officers who prudently discharge their duties and helps banks attract and retain qualified personnel. D&O insurance can cover the expense of defending suits alleging director or officer misconduct, and damages that may be awarded in such lawsuits. D&O insurance can reimburse the bank for any payments made to directors or officers under an indemnification agreement. Generally, the insuring company requires a deductible for this type of coverage. This insurance does not cover criminal or dishonest acts, when involved persons obtained personal gain, or when a conflict of interest was apparent.

Insurers may add exclusionary language to insurance policies that directors and officers should clearly understand, as it has the potential to limit coverage and leave officers and directors liable for claims not covered by these policies. For instance, during times of economic slowdown, a regulatory exclusion may be added to preclude coverage for lawsuits by federal and state banking regulators. Because there is no industry standard for D&O insurance, directors should be aware of the insuring agreements and exclusions that are most critical to their personal protection. The board's choice of coverage in a D&O insurance policy should be based on a well-informed analysis of the cost and benefits, and the potential impact that could result from exclusions. When considering renewals and amendments to existing policies, directors and officers should consider the following:

- What protections do I want from my bank's D&O insurance policy?
- What exclusions exist in my bank's D&O insurance policy?
- Are any of the exclusions new, and, if so, how do they change my D&O insurance coverage?
- What is my potential personal financial exposure arising from each D&O insurance policy exclusion?

D&O liability insurers have filed suits to rescind coverage against directors and officers in cases involving restatement of financials or other alleged financial misconduct. The insurers typically claim that the policy should be rescinded on the grounds that it was fraudulently procured. Directors and officers may consider a clean non-rescindable clause, providing that the insurer cannot rescind the policy based on alleged corporate wrongdoing or misrepresentations in the application process. Such a clause is generally not included in standard policies, and insurers charge a significant premium for its inclusion.

The severability clause of the D&O policy generally provides that no knowledge or statement by anyone insured in procuring coverage can

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be imputed to any other insured individual, limiting the potential that coverage will be adversely affected for one individual as the result of the actions of another. The practical effect of the severability clause is to require an insurer seeking to rescind a policy to prove knowledge of each insured person separately. Narrowly tailored severability clauses may limit the insurer's potential exposure.

Refer to the "Indemnification Agreements" section of this booklet for the instances in which the bank may and may not purchase D&O insurance to pay or reimburse an IAP.

## Fidelity Bond

Fidelity insurance includes reimbursement for loss, not only from employee dishonesty but also from robbery, burglary, theft, forgery, mysterious disappearance, and, in specified instances, damage to offices or fixtures of the insured. Fidelity bond coverage applies to all banking locations except automated teller machines, for which coverage must be specifically added by a rider. Standard procedure for insurance companies is to write fidelity bonds on a "discovery" basis. Under this method, the insurance company is liable up to the full amount of the policy for losses covered by the terms of the bond and discovered while the bond is in force, regardless of the date on which the loss was actually sustained by the bank. This procedure applies even though lower coverage amounts or more restrictive terms might have been in effect on the date the loss was sustained.

All fidelity bonds require that a loss be reported to the bonding company within a specified time after a reportable item comes to the attention of management. Management should diligently report all potential claims to the bank's insurance company because failure to file a timely report may jeopardize coverage for that loss.

Many banks also obtain an excess coverage policy. The coverage extends the basic protection provided under the fidelity bond in areas in which the dollar volume of assets or exposure is particularly high. Fidelity bond protection can be extended by purchasing optional riders.

If the bank discontinues efforts to obtain insurance after the policy lapses or is canceled, the board should be aware that

- the failure of directors to require bonds with adequate sureties and in sufficient amounts may make the directors personally liable for any losses the bank sustains because of the absence of such bonds. Common law standards have held directors liable in their "personal and individual capacity" for negligently failing to require an indemnity bond to cover employees with access to cash, notes, and securities.

- management should determine the reason for any denial of insurance or unreasonable terms; confirm that action is taken to correct any deficiencies and, when beneficial, provide additional information; and obtain insurance when feasible.
- although establishing a fund to cover losses is not a viable alternative to insurance, it may be used while attempting to obtain insurance (to be applied to premiums or to offset losses), or it may be used in addition to insurance to offset a high deductible. Establishing such a fund does not mean that an insurance cost or liability has been incurred. Therefore, estimated losses should not be reported as an expense in the call report until the losses actually occur.

When the bank is a subsidiary of a bank holding company, and the holding company has purchased one fidelity bond to cover all affiliated banks, the bank should be careful when determining that the policy is sufficient to cover the bank's exposures.

## Bank-Owned Life Insurance

Bank-owned life insurance (BOLI) is a form of life insurance purchased by banks in which the bank is the beneficiary or owner. This form of insurance is a tax shelter for the administering bank. The cash flows from a BOLI policy generally are income tax-free if the bank holds the policy for its full term. Banks are not authorized to purchase BOLI as an investment. BOLI can, however, provide attractive tax-equivalent yields to help offset the cost of employee benefits. Banks are expected to establish sound risk management processes, including meaningful risk limits, before implementing and adding to a BOLI program.<sup>181</sup>

## Specialized Bank Insurance

Management, in consultation with the board, may decide that they should obtain other bank insurance coverage to transfer risks. The following are some of the most frequently purchased types of specialized bank insurance:

**Automobile, public liability, and property damage:** Protects against property and liability losses arising from injury or death when a bank-owned, -rented, or -repossessed vehicle is involved. Non-ownership liability insurance should be considered if officers or employees use their own cars for bank business.

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<sup>181</sup> For more information, refer to OCC Bulletin 2004-56, "Bank-Owned Life Insurance: Interagency Statement on the Purchase and Risk Management of Life Insurance."

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**Boiler and machinery:** Provides coverage for loss due to explosion or other forms of destruction of boilers, heating or cooling systems, and similar types of equipment.

**Business disruption expense:** Provides funds for the additional costs of reestablishing the bank's operations after a disaster.

**Combination safe depository, coverage A:** Covers losses when the bank is legally obligated to pay for the loss (including damage or destruction) of a customer's property held in safe deposit boxes. **Coverage B:** Covers loss, damage, or destruction of property in customers' safe deposit boxes, whether or not the bank is legally liable, when such loss results from activities other than employee dishonesty. This policy commonly provides for reimbursement of legal fees in conjunction with defending suits involving alleged loss of property from safe deposit boxes.

**Cybersecurity:** Provides coverage to mitigate losses for a variety of cyber incidents, including data breaches, business interruption, and network damage.

**Fine arts:** Provides coverage for works of art on display at a bank, whether owned by the bank or on consignment. Protection typically is all risk and requires that appraisals of the objects be made regularly to establish the insurable value.

**Fire:** Covers all loss directly attributed to fire, including damage from smoke, water, or chemicals used to extinguish the fire. Additional fire damage for the building contents may be included but often is written in combination with the policy on the building and permanent fixtures. Most fire insurance policies contain "co-insurance" clauses, meaning that insurance coverage should be maintained at a fixed proportion of the replacement value of the building.

**First class, certified, and registered mail insurance:** Provides protection on shipment of property sent by various types of mail and during transit by messenger or carrier to and from the U.S. Postal Service. This coverage is used principally for registered mail over the maximum \$25,000 insurance provided by the U.S. Postal Service.

**Fraudulent accounts receivable and fraudulent warehouse receipts:** Covers losses resulting from the pledging of fraudulent or nonexistent accounts receivable and warehouse receipts, or from situations in which the pledger does not have title. In addition, this insurance offers protection against loss arising from diversion of proceeds through acts of dishonesty.

**General liability:** Covers possible losses arising from a variety of occurrences. General liability insurance provides coverage against specified hazards, such as personal injury, medical payments, landlords' or garage owners' liability, or other specific risks that may result in or create exposure to a suit for damages against the bank. "Comprehensive" general liability insurance covers all risks, except specific exclusions.

**Key person insurance:** Insures the bank on the life of an officer when the death of such officer, or key person, would be of such consequence as to give the bank an insurable interest.

**Mortgage errors and omissions:** Protects the bank, as mortgagee, from loss when fire or all-risk insurance on real property held as collateral inadvertently has not been obtained. This insurance is not intended to overcome errors in judgment, such as inadequate coverage or insolvency of an original insurer.

**Single interest:** Covers losses for uninsured vehicles that are pledged as collateral for an extension of credit.

**Transit cash letter insurance:** Covers loss of cash letter items in transit for collection or to a clearinghouse of which the insured bank is a member. This coverage also includes costs for reproducing cash letter items. Generally, such coverage does not include items sent by registered mail or air express or losses due to dishonest acts of employees.

**Trust operations errors and omissions:** Indemnifies against claims for damages arising from alleged acts resulting from error or omissions while acting as administrator under a trust agreement.

**Umbrella liability:** Provides excess coverage over existing liability policies, as well as basic coverage for most known risks not covered by existing insurance.

**Valuable papers and destruction of records:** Covers cost of reproducing records damaged or destroyed. This coverage also includes the cost of research needed to develop the facts required to replace books of accounts and records.

## Appendix E: Glossary

**Control functions:** Those functions that have a responsibility to provide independent and objective assessment, reporting, and assurance. They include the risk review, compliance, and internal audit functions.

**Corporate governance:** A set of relationships among a company's management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and by which the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.

**Credible challenge:** The method that directors use to hold management accountable by being engaged and asking questions and eliciting any facts necessary, when appropriate, to satisfy themselves that management's strategies are viable and in the bank's best interests.

**Duty of care:** The duty of a board member to decide and act in an informed and prudent manner with respect to the bank. Often interpreted as requiring a board member to approach the affairs of the company the same way that a "prudent person" would approach his or her own affairs.

**Duty of loyalty:** The duty of a board member to act in good faith in the interest of the company. The duty of loyalty should prevent an individual director from acting in his or her own interest, or in the interest of another individual or group, at the expense of the company and all shareholders.

**Independent director:** A director is viewed as independent if he or she is free of any family relationship or any material business or professional relationship (other than stock ownership and the directorship itself) with the bank, its holding company, its affiliate, or its management.

**Management director:** A member of the board (such as a director) who also has management responsibilities within the bank.

**Risk appetite statement:** The written statement of the aggregate level and types of risk that a bank is willing to assume to achieve its strategic objectives and business plan. It includes quantitative measures expressed relative to earnings, capital, risk measures, liquidity, and other relevant measures as appropriate. It should include qualitative statements to address money laundering and unethical practices.

**Risk culture:** The bank's norms, attitudes, and behaviors related to risk awareness, risk taking, and risk management, and controls that shape decisions on risks. Risk culture influences the decisions of management and employees during day-to-day activities and affects the risks they assume.

**Risk governance framework:** A part of the corporate governance framework, through which the board and management, in their respective roles, establish and make decisions about the bank's strategy and risk approach; articulate and monitor adherence to risk appetite and risk limits consistent with the bank's strategy; and identify, measure, monitor, and control risks.

**Risk limits:** Specific quantitative measures based on, for example, forward-looking assumptions that allocate the bank's risk appetite to business lines; legal entities as relevant, specific risk categories; concentrations; and, as appropriate, other measures.

**Risk management:** The processes established to identify, measure, monitor, and control material risks and associated risk concentrations.

**Risk profile:** Point-in-time assessment of the bank's risks, aggregated within and across each relevant risk category based on current and forward-looking assumptions.

## Appendix F: Abbreviations

AML	anti-money laundering
BOLI	bank-owned life insurance
BSA	Bank Secrecy Act
C&D	cease-and-desist
CAMELS	capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk
CEO	chief executive officer
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CMP	civil money penalty
CMS	compliance management system
CRA	Community Reinvestment Act
CRE	chief risk executive
CSA	covered savings association
D&O	director and officer
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Fed. Reg.	Federal Register
FFIEC	Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
FSA	federal savings association
IAP	institution-affiliated party
IRM	independent risk management
IT	information technology
MIS	management information systems
MRA	matter requiring attention
OCC	Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OTS	Office of Thrift Supervision
PCA	prompt corrective action
USC	U.S. Code

# References

Listed references apply to national banks and FSAs unless otherwise noted.

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- 12 USC 24(Fifth), “Corporate Powers of Association” (national banks)
- 12 USC 24a(e), “Provisions Applicable to National Banks That Fail to Continue to Meet Certain Requirements” (national banks)
- 12 USC 71, “Election” (national banks)
- 12 USC 71a, “Number of Directors; Penalties” (national banks)
- 12 USC 72, “Qualifications” (national banks)
- 12 USC 76, “President of Bank as Member of Board; Chairman of Board” (national banks)
- 12 USC 161, “Reports to Comptroller of the Currency” (national banks)
- 12 USC 191, “Appointment of Receiver for a National Bank” (national banks)
- 12 USC 371c, “Banking Affiliates”
- 12 USC 371c-1, “Restrictions on Transactions with Affiliates”
- 12 USC 481, “Appointment of Examiners; Examination of Member Banks, State Banks, and Trust Companies; Reports” (national banks)
- 12 USC 1463, “Supervision of Savings Associations” (FSAs)
- 12 USC 1464, “Federal Savings Associations” (FSAs)
- 12 USC 1813(u), “Institution-Affiliated Party”
- 12 USC 1817(a), “Reports of Condition; Access to Reports”
- 12 USC 1818, “Termination of Status as Insured Depository Institution”
- 12 USC 1820(d), “Annual On-Site Examinations of All Insured Depository Institutions Required”
- 12 USC 1821(c)(5), “Grounds for Appointing Conservator or Receiver”
- 12 USC 1828(z), “General Prohibition on Sale of Assets”
- 12 USC 1829, “Penalty for Unauthorized Participation by Convicted Individual”

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- 12 USC 1831i, "Agency Disapproval of Directors and Senior Executive Officers of Insured Depository Institutions or Depository Institution Holding Companies"
- 12 USC 1831m, "Early Identification of Needed Improvements in Financial Management"
- 12 USC 1831o, "Prompt Corrective Action"
- 12 USC 1831p-1, "Standards for Safety and Soundness"
- 12 USC 1867(c), "Services Performed by Contract or Otherwise"
- 12 USC 2901 et seq., "Community Reinvestment"
- 12 USC 3907, "Capital Adequacy"
- 12 USC 5481, "Definitions" [Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection]
- 12 USC 5515, "Supervision of Very Large Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions"
- 15 USC 45, "Unfair Methods of Competition Unlawful; Prevention by Commission"
- 15 USC 78a et seq., "Securities Exchange Act of 1934"
- 15 USC 1691(a), "Activities Constituting Discrimination"
- 18 USC 215, "Receipt of Commissions or Gifts for Procuring Loans"
- 18 USC 656, "Theft, Embezzlement, or Misapplication by Bank Officer or Employee"
- 18 USC 1001, "Statements or Entries Generally"
- 18 USC 1005, "Bank Entries, Reports, and Transactions"
- 18 USC 1344, "Bank Fraud"
- 31 USC 5322, "Criminal Penalties"
- 42 USC 3604, "Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Housing and Other Prohibited Practices"
- 42 USC 3605, "Discrimination in Residential Real Estate-Related Transactions"
- 52 USC 30101 et seq., "Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971"
- Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

**Regulations**

- 11 CFR 100, subpart B, "Definition of Contribution" (national banks)
- 11 CFR 114.2, "Prohibitions on Contributions, Expenditures and Electioneering Communications"

- 12 CFR 3, “Capital Adequacy Standards”
- 12 CFR 4, “Organization and Functions, Availability and Release of Information, Contracting Outreach Program, Post-Employment Restrictions for Senior Examiners”
- 12 CFR 5, “Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities”
- 12 CFR 6, “Prompt Corrective Action”
- 12 CFR 7, “Activities and Operations”
- 12 CFR 9, “Fiduciary Activities of National Banks” (national banks and CSAs)
- 12 CFR 16, “Securities Offering Disclosure Rules”
- 12 CFR 19.132, “Disciplinary Orders”
- 12 CFR 21, “Minimum Security Devices and Procedures, Reports of Suspicious Activity, and Bank Secrecy Act Compliance Program”
- 12 CFR 25, “Community Reinvestment Act and Interstate Deposit Production Regulations” (national banks and CSAs)
- 12 CFR 30, “Safety and Soundness Standards”
- 12 CFR 31, “Extensions of Credit to Insiders and Transactions With Affiliates”
- 12 CFR 32, “Lending Limits”
- 12 CFR 34, “Real Estate Lending and Appraisals”
- 12 CFR 41, “Fair Credit Reporting”
- 12 CFR 101, “Covered Savings Associations” (CSAs)
- 12 CFR 145.121, “Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Employees” (FSAs and CSAs)
- 12 CFR 150, “Fiduciary Powers of Federal Savings Associations” (FSAs)
- 12 CFR 160, “Lending and Investment” (FSAs)
- 12 CFR 163, “Savings Associations – Operations” (FSAs)
- 12 CFR 168, “Security Procedures” (FSAs and CSAs)
- 12 CFR 206, “Limitations on Interbank Liabilities (Regulation F)”
- 12 CFR 215, “Loans to Executive Officers, Directors, and Principal Shareholders of Member Banks (Regulation O)”
- 12 CFR 223, “Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates (Regulation W)”
- 12 CFR 225, “Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y)”

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- 12 CFR 229, "Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC)"
- 12 CFR 359, "Golden Parachute and Indemnification Payments"
- 12 CFR 363, "Annual Independent Audits and Reporting Requirements"
- 12 CFR 1026.36, "Prohibited Acts or Practices and Certain Requirements for Credit Secured by a Dwelling"
- 31 CFR 1020.210, "Anti-Money Laundering Program Requirements for Financial Institutions Regulated Only by a Federal Functional Regulator, Including Banks, Savings Associations, and Credit Unions"

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